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Disgorgement Principle
INTRODUCTION
It is a principle of the law of restitution that one should not gain by
one's own wrong;" it is a principle of the law of contracts that damages for
breach should be based on the injured party's lost expectation.2 In many
cases, the principles are mutually consistent. If, on breach, the injured
party's lost expectation equals or exceeds the gain by the party in breach,
then damages based on expectation strip the party in breach of all gain,
and make the injured party whole. But if the injured party's lost expecta-
tion is less than the gain realized by the party in breach, then damages
based on expectation do not strip the party in breach of all gain. This
situation brings the two principles into conflict. When faced with this di-
lemma, courts have declined to apply the principle of restitution, holding
in effect that a "mere" breach of contract is not a "wrong," and allowing
the party in breach to keep part of the gain.'
Commentators who consider a breach to be a "wrong," however, have
argued that even if the gain realized by the party in breach exceeds the
injured party's loss, the measure of damages should strip the party in
breach of all gain." This Article examines this "disgorgement principle"
and concludes, first, that it is not sound as a general proposition and,
second, that there is nonetheless a case for its limited application.
Suppose that you and I have made a contract under which I am to sell
you a widget for $100, cash on delivery. At the time we made the contract,
I valued the widget at $90 and you valued it at $110, so the contract
seemed advantageous to both of us. But instead of delivering the widget to
you, I found another buyer willing to pay $125 and sold it to that buyer,
realizing $25 over our contract price. Since you still valued the widget at
$110, I offered you $10 out of that $25. Can you recover $25 from me?5
Since, according to conventional wisdom, my "mere" breach of contract
is not a "wrong," you can recover only $10 and not $25. The $10 that I
offered you would put you in as good a position as you would have been
1. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 3 (1937) ("A person is not permitted to profit by his own
wrong at the expense of another.").
2. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1978) (remedies "shall be liberally administered to the end that
the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed
3. "The question is not one of making the defendant disgorge what he has saved by committing
the wrong, but one of compensating the plaintiff." Tito v. Waddell (No. 2), [1977] 1 Ch. 106, 332.
(Sir Robert Megarry, V.C.) Cases in which an injured party has sought disgorgement in preference to
expectation are, however, rare.
4. See infra note 46.
5. We shall defer consideration of possible reasons why the other buyer valued the widget more
highly than you did.
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in had the contract been performed, since that amount, plus the $100 you
have not paid me, equals the value of the widget to you.6
Those who view my breach as a "wrong," however, would require me
to disgorge all of the $25, because it is the sum that I gained by my
wrong. Although the disgorgement principle is based on avoiding unjust
enrichment of the party in breach, the word "disgorgement" is preferable
to "restitution" for two reasons. First, it may avoid confusion between the
asserted right to recover under this controversial principle and well-
established rights to restitution. For example, it distinguishes between
your asserted tight to my full $25 gain under the disgorgement principle
and your well-established right to restitution of the $100 price if you had
paid in advance.7 Second, it helps to make clear that the principle applies
without regard to whether the injured party can be said to have "lost"
something that the party in breach is being asked to "restore." ' For exam-
ple, it makes it easier to see that under the disgorgement principle your
asserted right to $25 does not depend on the widget I sold having become
"your" widget so that there was a loss on your part as well as a gain on
mine.
Part I of this Article describes the causation problems associated with
the disgorgement principle and argues that courts should limit recovery
under the disgorgement principle by imposing a strict requirement of
cause in fact. Part II discusses the past history and present recognition of
the disgorgement principle and concludes that, while the principle is rec-
6. Your expectation damages do not take account of the possibility that you could have sold the
widget to the second buyer for $125. If they did, your expectation damages would be $25 and would
result in disgorgement.
7. You would probably not want to assert a restitutionary claim for only $100 if you had a claim
for $110 based on the expectation principle. But if, for example, it turned out that you had misinter-
preted our agreement and I was under no duty to deliver the widget to you, you would be glad to have
a restitutionary claim for $100.
8. In the typical case of restitution where a contract is involved, the plaintiff has "lost" something
(e.g., performance or preparation for performance) and the defendant has benefited from that loss. See
RESTATEMENT OF REsTrruTiON § 128 comment f, at 531 (1937) ("an action not based upon loss is
not restitutionary"). Even John Dawson, an advocate of the disgorgement principle, thought that the
kind of recovery that is the subject of this Article "could not be explained as restitution under present-
day tests; there would be a fatal break in the chain of causation, for the asset or conduct that was
merely promised would not have come from the promisee." Dawson, Restitution or Damages?, 20
OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 187 (1959).
It is not, however, essential to a restitutionary claim that the plaintiff have suffered a loss. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF REsTrrTTION § 1 & comment g, at 16 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983) ("a
loss suffered by the claimant and the infringement of an interest of his . . .[are] alternative constitu-
ents of a right to restitution"). Thus a principal is entitled to a bribe received by an agent even though
it occasioned no loss to the principal. See RESTATEMENT OF REsTrru'iON, § 128 comment f (1937);
see also Federal Sugar Ref. Co. v. United States Sugar Equalization Bd., 268 F. 575, 582 (S.D.N.Y.
1920) ("The point is not whether a definite something was taken away from plaintiff and added to
the treasury of defendant. The point is whether defendant unjustly enriched itself by doing a wrong to
plaintiff in such manner and in such circumstances that in equity and good conscience defendant
should not be permitted to retain that by which it has been enriched.").
1342
Disgorgement Principle
ognized in a few categories of contract disputes, it is undesirable to extend
those categories. Part III analyzes one significant field of applica-
tion-nonperformance of contracts for goods or services available on a
market-and demonstrates that the disgorgement principle is not suitable
as a general basis for recovery. Part IV considers the case for a limited
extension of the disgorgement principle and suggests that courts apply the
principle to situations involving what is termed "abuse of contract," on the
ground that the breach has subjected the injured party to a significant risk
of undercompensation if recovery is limited to expectation.
I. A CASE FOR A STRICT REQUIREMENT OF CAUSE
When one speaks of "gain" in the context of the disgorgement princi-
ple, one means gain that is in some sense caused by the breach of contract.
Thus if, in the case of the widget resold, I had two widgets and sold both
of them to the other buyer for $125 each, even the disgorgement principle
would not give you a claim to more than $25. Your claim to anything
more than that would fail on the ground that my breach was not the cause
of the additional gain.
Advocates of the disgorgement principle, however, treat questions of
cause briefly if at all." Indeed, they often phrase the disgorgement princi-
ple in a way that obscures questions of cause. So, in the assertion "one
should not gain by one's own wrong," the single word "by" must carry the
burden of articulating that the gains referred to are gains that are caused
by the wrong. Because it is not common to view the disgorgement princi-
ple through the optic of causation, this Article will consider three ques-
tions and one practical problem relating to cause that will arise in the
later discussion.
A. Question of Cause in Fact
In discussions of disgorgement, the words "gain" and "profit" are
sometimes used interchangeably. But if a strict test of cause in fact ("but-
for" cause) is applied, and one asks to what extent the profit could have
resulted had there been no breach of contract, it becomes evident that not
all profit is gain.
Suppose that I had two identical widgets, either of which I could have
delivered under our contract, and that I sold both to other buyers, one for
$125 and one for $110. Even without a breach of our contract, I could
have sold one of the widgets for $125. I would therefore contend that my
9. The most extensive discussion of cause, including references to briefer treatments, fills only
.about a page near the end of Jones, The Recovery of Benefits Gained from a Breach of Contract, 99
LAW Q. REv. 443, 457-58 (1983).
1343
The Yale Law Journal
breach of contract was not a cause in fact of my $25 profit, since even
without a breach I could still have sold one widget for $125.
Now suppose that I did not have a second widget, but could have
bought one on the market for $110. I would still contend that even with-
out a breach of our contract I could have sold one widget for $125, by
buying it on the market for $110, so that my breach of contract was not a
cause in fact of my $25 profit. I would have to admit that my breach was
the cause in fact of a $10 gain, since the breach enabled me to avoid going
into the market at $110, but $10 is what I have offered you under the
expectation principle. In effect, my argument is that what I have gained
by my breach is not my net profit from resale but my savings by not
arranging a substitute transaction that would have avoided breach.
It may at first seem strained to argue that my breach of contract was
not the cause of my net profit on the ground that I could have realized
that gain by some other means.10 Yet courts have accepted just such argu-
ments in analogous situations.
In Dunkley Co. v. Central California Canneries,"1 for example, the
holder of a combination patent on a peach-peeling machine sought to re-
cover profits from an infringer. The court denied recovery, explaining
that, since the patent was limited to the specific combination, the defen-
dant could have achieved the same result using unpatented machinery.
Therefore the profits recoverable should be only those that the infringer
"derived from the use of the invention, as compared with other means
then open to the public and adequate to enable him to obtain an equally
beneficial result."1 There was no proof that the wrongdoer made any
greater profit by infringing the patent than could have been made without
infringement.
This argument has also been accepted where a person tortiously de-
prives the owner of goods that are later returned to the owner. In an
English case, Strand Electric & Engineering Co. v. Brisford Entertain-
10. This is a variant of a problem that Hart and HonorE discuss in the category of alternative
causes-for example, "A wrongly puts B's goods where they are destroyed by fire but, had he not
done so, another fire would have destroyed them." As they point out, "we may save the test by
refining the description of the event" and asking whether the result would have happened in the
particular way in which it did. H.L.A. HART & A. HONORi, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 118-19
(1959). Though they conclude that the "normally accepted view is that in all such circumstances
defendant's wrongful act has caused the harm," id. at 226, they concede that the answer is less clear if
the question is one of the amount of compensation, id. at 226-28.
Most questions of cause are posed in connection with loss, not gain, and people do not usually
intend to inflict loss. In the case of the widget resold, I am intent on realizing gain for me, not loss for
you. The breach is not the cause in fact of my gain. Even if there had been no breach, I would have
realized the gain in another way.
11. 7 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1925); see also Black v. Thorne, 111 U.S. 122 (1884) (patent damages
only nominal when other common methods would produce same result as patented method).
12. 7 F.2d at 975.
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ments,13 a prospective buyer of a theater took possession of the theater and
used some portable switchboards that the theater owner had rented from a
switchboard-rental company. The court held that the rental company was
entitled "to a reasonable hire," even though this exceeded the rental com-
pany's actual loss. Lord Denning reasoned:
If the wrongdoer had asked the owner for permission to use the
goods, the owner would be entitled to ask for a reasonable remunera-
tion as the price of his permission. The wrongdoer cannot be better
off because he did not ask permission. He cannot be better off by
doing wrong than he would be by doing right. He must therefore
pay a reasonable hire. 4
Thus damages were based on the prospective buyer's gain in terms of its
savings. Actual profit was irrelevant and there was no "need to evaluate
the actual benefit which resulted to the defendants by having the plain-
tiffs' equipment at their disposal."1 5 The wrongdoer's gain was the sum
that it would have cost to realize the same profit without the tort-the
sum that the wrongdoer saved by not obtaining a substitute on the market.
Adherence to a strict requirement of cause in fact in these cases yields a
measure of gain not in terms of profit but in terms of what the wrongdoer
saved by not arranging some other means of accomplishing the same
end-a measure of gain in terms of saving of the cost of other means. If
this approach is sound when the wrong is an infringement of a patent or a
commission of a tort, it merits consideration when the wrong is a "mere"
breach of contract.
If I could have obtained a substitute widget, the approach leads to a
measure of gain in terms of saving of the cost of substitution. But suppose
13. [1952] 2 Q.B. 246 (action in detinue).
14. Id. at 254. As long ago as 1892, William Keener argued that the measure of recovery for use
of land should be "such a sum as the jury would have been authorized to give, had there been a
contract between the plaintiff and the defendant that the latter should pay the reasonable value of his
user." Keener, Waiver of Tort, 6 HARV. L. REv. 223, 226 (1892). Palmer criticizes Keener's reason-
ing as encouraging "the belief ... that profits are never recoverable in quasi contract." I G.
PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTrUTION § 2.12, at 158-59 (1978). But in this Article the question is
whether, and to what extent, profits should be recoverable for breach of contract.
15. [1952] 2 Q.B. at 256 (Romer, L.J.). The court also held that the trial judge erred in limiting
recovery to the plaintiffs' lost rentals, which would have been less than the reasonable hire because,
among other things, only about 75% of plaintiffs' switchboards were rented out at any time. This
aspect of Strand was followed by Lord Denning in Penarth Dock Eng'g Co. v. Pounds, [1963] 1
Lloyd's List L.R. 359, 362, in holding that when a buyer of a dock broke its contract with sellers to
remove a pontoon from its berth within a reasonable time, the measure of damages was "not what the
[sellers] have lost, but what benefit the [buyer] obtained by having the use of the berth," and this is
what, if "he had moved it elsewhere, he would have had to pay . . . ." See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF RFSTIM ON § 45 comment c, at 145-46 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984) ("[E]ven an inno-
cent converter, chargeable with the use value of property. . . cannot reduce his liability by showing
that the claimant would not have availed himself of that value.").
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that the widget is unique, so that no substitute is available. I could still
argue that I could have arranged to realize the gain by some means that
would have avoided the wrong; for example, when the second buyer ap-
peared on the scene, I could have negotiated with you a release from my
obligation to deliver the widget, so that I could have sold it to the other
buyer for $125 without a breach of our contract. The gain that was
caused by my breach is the sum that I would have had to pay you for that
release, if we had fairly negotiated on the assumption that my only alter-
native to performing was to reach agreement and not to breach."l The
suggested approach then leads to a measure of gain in terms of saving of
the cost of modification.
The reader who finds this measure contrived should recall that it is
analogous to one of the measures for patent infringement. Case law and
subsequent statutes have held the infringer liable to pay, as a minimum,
"a reasonable royalty."17 As the court explained in the leading case of
Egry Register Co. v. Standard Register Co.:"
To adopt a reasonable royalty as the measure of damages is to
adopt . . . the fiction that a license was to be granted at the time of
beginning the infringement, and then to determine what the license
price should have been ....
In fixing a reasonable royalty, the primary inquiry . . . is what
the parties would have agreed upon, if both were reasonably trying
to reach an agreement.19
16. Discussions do not always make clear, however, whether what is referred to is a gain to the
party in breach or a loss to the injured party. If no transaction costs are involved in the supposed
negotiations, the sum that I would have to pay could be regarded as your loss as well as my gain.
17. As for case law, see Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 648
(1915) ("JI]t was permissible to show the value [of what was taken] by proving what would have been
a reasonable royalty ... ."). The statutory provision for a reasonable royalty dates from 1922 and is
now found at 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1982) (requiring court to award damages "in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer" and allowing the court to
"receive expert testimony as an aid to the determination ... of what royalty would be reasonable
under the circumstances").
The rule for patents has been extended to allow a reasonable royalty for the wrongful appropria-
tion of a trade secret. See University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518,
535-36 (5th Cir. 1974) (because defendants "failed in their marketing efforts, no actual profits exist,"
and since plaintiff retained use of secret and "there has been no effective disclosure of the secret
through publication the total value of the secret to the plaintiff is an inappropriate measure") (foot-
note omitted); cf. Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp.,
401 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975), discussed infra text accompanying note 118.
18. 23 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1928) (device was part of a larger product).
19. Id. at 443. This language has often been repeated. See, e.g., Vitro Corp. of Am. v. Hall
Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 678, 682-83 (6th Cir. 1961); see also Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States
Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (referring to what "a willing licensor and
a willing licensee would have agreed upon in a supposititious negotiation"), modified, 446 F.2d 295
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971). In United States Frumentum Co. v. Lauhoff, 216 F.
610, 616 (6th Cir. 1914), the court analogized the reasonable royalty rule to the rule under which
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If the use of a measure of gain in terms of saving of the cost of modifi-
cation can be defended in the case of an infringement of a patent, then it
should not be ruled out in the case of a breach of contract.20 In sum, there
is support for a strict requirement of cause in fact, leading to a general
measure of gain, not in terms of profits but in terms of saving of the cost
of other means. This measure might either be in terms of saving of the
cost of substitution or in terms of saving of the cost of modification. The
measure has advantages in dealing with the two remaining questions of
causation.
B. Question of Joint Cause
The next question is how to treat joint cause. Assume that the argu-
ments just made are rejected, and my breach of contract is regarded as the
cause in fact of all of my $25 profit, so that profit and not savings is the
measure of my gain. Suppose that it was through my skill and industry
that I located the other buyer who was willing to pay $125. My skill and
industry are now, together with my breach, joint causes of my $25
profit.2" Or suppose that instead of reselling the widget to another buyer,
I kept it and used it in my factory in a manufacturing process, making a
$25 profit and offering you $10 under the expectation principle. My skill
and industry and my capital investment in my factory are now joint
causes of my $25 profit. How is a court to respond to my argument that
even if you are entitled to recover some of my profit under the disgorge-
ment principle, you are not entitled to all of it and some apportionment is
required ?22
It is well settled that a patent or copyright infringer is entitled to an
apportionment that recognizes the infringer's contribution to any profit.
As Chief Justice Hughes explained in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pic-
persons "familiar with real estate estimate and testify to the real value or fair value of land which is
without market value."
The reasonable royalty rule can be justified on the ground of loss to the patentee as well as on the
ground, suggested here, of gain to the infringer. See infra text accompanying note 20. In Aro Mfg.
Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505 (1964), four members of the Supreme
Court declared that the "reasonable royalty" provision in the patent statute would apply if the
"amount constitutes 'damages' for the infringement," since the provision for recovery of profit had
been deleted from the statute. However, in Marvel Specialty Co. v. Bell Hosiery Mills, 386 F.2d 287
(4th Cir. 1967), the court held that Aro did not prevent the patentee from recovering damages based
on gross rather than net rentals, a conclusion that suggests gain in terms of savings.
20. There is, to be sure, the difference that in the patent infringement case what the infringer
would have agreed to may be suggested by the cost of other available alternatives.
21. If I had paid a broker to use skill and industry to find the other buyer, the broker's fee would
be subtracted in calculating my profit.
22. Your recovery of your loss under the expectation principle would, after all, be diminished to
the extent that you contributed to that loss by failing to mitigate it. Why, then, should your recovery
of my gain under the disgorgement principle not be diminished to the extent that I contributed to it?
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tures Corp. ,23 an owner of a patent or copyright should recover "only that
part of the profits found to be attributable to the use of the copyrighted
[or patented] material as distinguished from what the infringer himself
has supplied . . " In applying this principle where an infringer, in
making a movie, had taken material from a copyrighted play, Hughes
observed that what is required is not "mathematical exactness" but only a
"reasonable approximation." '24 By analogy, then, one who breaks a con-
tract should be allowed the same right to apportionment.
Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co.25 illustrates the failure of courts to grapple
with the issue of joint cause and to apportion damages appropriately. In
Qiwell, the seller of an egg-packing plant retained ownership of an egg-
washing machine, which was to be stored on premises near the plant. At
first, the buyer of the plant washed eggs by hand, but when World War
II caused a labor shortage, the buyer wrongfully took the machine and for
three years used it to wash eggs. Although the owner of the machine
would not have used it during that time, the court granted restitution of
the benefit to the user of the machine, which the court based on "savings
in labor cost" of $1.43 per hour-the cost to wash the eggs by hand over
the three-year period. But by using this basis for "savings," the court ig-
nored the question of joint cause. The decision has been rightly criticized
on the ground that "the saving of labor expenses . . . could be achieved
only by use in that enterprise, which was the defendant's contribution."2
The court would have avoided unjustly including the defendant's contri-
bution in the plaintiff's recovery if, as suggested above, it had measured
gain in terms of saving of the cost of other means. If the defendant could
have rented another egg-washing machine, the defendant's saving of the
cost of substitution would be of fair rental value. An alternative would be
the cost of modification, that is, the rental that in the court's view the
23. 309 U.S. 390, 396 (1940) (applying apportionment principles developed in patent cases to
copyright case).
24. Id. at 404. This principle of apportionment appears in the Copyright Act of 1976, which
allows an infringer to reduce liability by proving "the elements of profit attributable to factors other
than the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1982).
25. 26 Wash. 2d 282, 173 P.2d 652 (1946). For a case using a similar measure, see Ablah v.
Eyman, 188 Kan. 665, 365 P.2d 181 (1961) (gain resulting from conversion of accountant's working
papers was amount that converter saved by using them to prepare for tax audit).
26. 1 G. PALMER, supra note 14, § 2.12, at 160-61; see also Dawson, Restitution Without En-
richment, 61 B.U.L. REv. 563, 612 (1981), where Dawson observes that "there must have been some
place where [egg-washing machines] had been bought and sold, perhaps even rented." Dawson also
argues that "the shifty phrase, 'saving of expenditure,' . . . should be shunned like contagious dis-
ease" since it "calls for a guess as to what would have been spent if [the assets] had not been taken or
used." Id. But this is an odd criticism, since the relevance of the cost of renting an egg-washing
machine would seem to be to show what saving of expenditure resulted from the defendant's not
renting one elsewhere.
1348
Vol. 94: 1339, 1985
Disgorgement Principle
parties would have agreed upon if they had reasonably tried to reach
agreement at the time that the defendant's need for the machine arose.27
C. Question of Remote Cause
The third question is what to do about remote cause. Assume again
that the arguments made above are rejected, and that my breach of con-
tract is regarded as the cause in fact of all of my $25 profit. Suppose that
after reselling the widget, I used that $25 to buy stock, which soon rose in
value to $250, whereupon I sold it and used the proceeds to buy a piece of
land, which soon rose in value to $2,500, whereupon I sold it and used the
proceeds to start my own business, which (since I have worked without
salary) is now worth $25,000. Are you entitled to $25,000 under the dis-
gorgement principle?
Consider an analogous claim to $25,000 damages under the expectation
principle, based on the following argument: Had I delivered the widget to
you, you could have resold it yourself to the other buyer for $125, and
with the additional $25 bought stock, which would have risen to $250,
enabling you to buy a piece of land which would have risen in value to
$2,500, enabling you to start a business which would now be worth
$25,000. Such a claim would surely fail, if not on the ground that you
failed to mitigate your damages, then on the ground either that your lost
gain of $25,000 was not foreseeable or that it was not proved with suffi-
cient certainty. Because your loss is hypothetical, it is particularly unlikely
that you would recover anything more than $25, if that.28
But your claim to $25,000 under the disgorgement principle is a claim
to actual, not hypothetical, gain. One can trace the profit from the widget
into the stock, into the land, and into the business. And when the profit
from the widget has been traced into its product in the hands of the
wrongdoer, a court need only impose a constructive trust in order to re-
quire the wrongdoer to disgorge that profit no matter how remote.29 Once
we admit that my breach of contract is the cause in fact of my $25 profit,
a difficulty arises of putting limits on the remoteness of cause under the
27. The facts of the case suggest that the cost of modification would have been considerably less
than the saving in labor cost. The total saving in labor cost was S1560, though the court allowed only
$900 because that was all that the complaint asked. After the machine's owner discovered the wrong-
ful use, however, he offered to settle the dispute by selling the machine to the defendant for $600. The
parties failed to reach agreement when a counteroffer of $50 was refused. 26 Wash. 2d at 284, 173
P.2d at 653.
28. You might not recover even $25 if you could have covered for less than $125, or if a profit of
$25 on resale was extraordinary.
29. Imposing a constructive trust on property because of a wrongful act has two consequences if
the property is exchanged. One is to treat profit realized from a product of the property as causally
connected with the wrongful act. The other is to give priority over other creditors in the product of the
property.
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disgorgement principle. The question of remote cause is avoided, however,
if recovery is limited to gain in terms of saving of the cost of other means,
because by their nature savings cannot be identified and traced into prop-
erty as profits can."0
D. Problem of Proof
In addition to these three questions relating to cause, there is a practical
problem of proof It is one thing for you to prove, under the expectation
principle, how much loss (including loss of gain) was caused by my
breach. The loss (including loss of gain) at issue is your loss, and evidence
of it is likely to be easily accessible to you. It is another thing for you to
prove, under the disgorgement principle, how much gain was caused by
my breach. The gain at issue is my gain and evidence of it is not likely to
be easily accessible to you. Even if a bill for accounting is available, the
obstacles may be substantial.3" Practical problems also inhere in measur-
ing gain in terms of saving the cost of modification. But these problems
are less serious than those of proving profits.
E. Summary
A strict requirement of cause in fact would limit the extent of recovery
under the disgorgement principle and make it easier to defend the princi-
ple. As has been pointed out, there are other advantages to a strict re-
quirement that limits disgorgement to saving: First, it aids in grappling
with the problem of joint cause that has been so troublesome in other
fields. Second, it avoids the question of remote cause. And third, it avoids
the problem of proving profits. For these reasons the following discussion
of the disgorgement principle will give special attention to the possibility
of limiting recovery to gain measured in terms of saving of the cost of
other means.
30. Tracing requires the claimant to prove both "that the wrongdoer once had property legally or
equitably belonging to him" and "that he still holds the property or property which is in whole or in
part its product." RESTATEMENT OF RESTIrUTION § 215 comment a, at 866 (1937). Tracing is
therefore not possible in the case of a saving, since it is not property.
31. As one writer has put it, "this right to the account. . . is, save in the most simple of cases, of
dubious value. . . The inquiry necessary to make that calculation often renders nugatory the practi-
cal value of the remedy." P. FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 120 (1977). For a similar conclusion,
see GREAT BRITAIN LAW COMMISSION, BREACH OF CONFIDENCE 93 (Working Paper No. 58, 1974)
("In practice . . . an account of profits is not generally a very satisfactory remedy . . . ."); see also
D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 254 (1973) ("measurement of business profits
from an active operation is at best a difficult matter . . . .These problems are so great that the
accounting for profits may well be appropriately denied to avoid the delay, complexity, and perhaps
injustice even where, in principle, the accounting might seem appropriate.").
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISGORGEMENT PRINCIPLE
A. Origins
The preeminence of the expectation principle as a basis for awarding
damages in breach of contract goes back to the sixteenth century. Details
are obscure because damages were left largely to the discretion of the jury
until well into the eighteenth century. 2 In spite of the inscrutable nature
of jury verdicts, however, we have some indications of how common law
judges viewed the basis of damages for breach of contract.
Although "expectation" was not part of the sixteenth-century legal vo-
cabulary, cases of the period recognize the principle that damages are to
be based on loss in value to the plaintiff. For example, the wrong inherent
in a failure to perform a promise to deliver barley was seen as "an act
against my bargain and to my deceit, whereby I am put to loss." 3 In a
later case, a buyer of barley was allowed an action on the case because,
when the seller failed to deliver, the buyer had been "driven to buy barley
for his business, being a brewer, at a much greater price."" Though
plaintiffs continued to allege deceit, what they asked for was lost profit.35
When these cases were decided, the rule was that if parties exchanged
promises, their promises were independent." If a breach occurred before
either party had performed, the plaintiff's expectation was the full value
of the defendant's performance, with no deduction for the plaintiff's cost
of rendering the return performance because, in theory, the plaintiff still
had to perform.
It was not until 1773 that the concept of the dependency of promises, or
what we now call "constructive conditions"' 7 of exchange, was fashioned
in Lord Mansfield's opinion, Kingston v. Preston.8 When promises came
32. S. MnLsOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 332-39 (2d ed. 1981); A.
SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE ACTION OF As-
SUMPSrr 582-87 (1975); S. STOLJAR, A HISTORY OF CONTRACT AT COMMON LAW 39-44 (1975).
Atiyah is in agreement in substance, though not in terminology. See infra note 38. Morton Horwitz is
an exception. See Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARv. L. REV.
917, 936-41 (1974), where he contends that the "first recognition of expectation damages appeared
after 1790 in both England and America in cases involving speculation in stock." Id. at 937. This
conclusion is vigorously disputed in Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U.
CHI. L. REV. 533, 555-61 (1979). On the roles of judge and jury, see Washington, Damages in
Contract at Common Law (pt. 2), 48 LAW Q. REV. 90 (1932).
33. Orwell v. Mortoft, Y.B. Mich. 20 Henry 7, f. 8, pl. 18 (1505) (Frowicke, C.J.C.). This case
is described in A. SIMPSON, supra note 32, at 262-64, and is also relied on by Stoijar, see S. STOLJAR,
supra note 32, at 39-42.
34. Core's Case, 73 Eng. Rep. 42, 47 (1537).
35. See S. MILsOM, supra note 32, at 335 (sixteenth-century allegation of "the loss of profit
which the plaintiff would have made had the agreement been kept" is common).
36. For discussion of this period, see Francis, The Structure ofJudicial Administration and the
Development of Contract Law in Seventeenth-Century England, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 35 (1983).
37. Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract, 28 YALE L.J. 739, 743-44 (1919).
38. 98 Eng. Rep. 606 (1773), discussed in Jones v. Barkley, 2 Doug. 685, 689, 99 Eng. Rep. 434,
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to be regarded as dependent, the defendant's breach excused the plaintiff
from performing and the plaintiff's expectation measure was based on the
value of the defendant's performance less the cost to the plaintiff of ren-
dering the return performance.3 9
The expectation measure was virtually unchallenged for four centu-
ries.4" Less than fifty years ago, Lon Fuller's and William Perdue's
landmark study of damages disturbed this calm. Fuller and Purdue
pointed out that damages based on expectation are in some instances too
generous, and proposed damages determined by a reliance measure in-
stead.41 Others have suggested that damages based on expectation may in
some instances be too grudging a form of relief. These suggestions have
taken two approaches.
The first approach retains the injured party's expectation as a goal but
argues that conventional contract damages are inadequate to achieve that
goal. These damages do not take account of the value that this particular
plaintiff may place on performance nor of the plaintiff's transaction costs,
such as those of bringing suit. Undercompensation will often result be-
cause the plaintiff will get far less than lost expectation. 42 Thus "super-
436-37 (1781). Even before Kingston v. Preston, however, in a case where the seller had actually
resold the goods to another buyer, Common Pleas upheld the verdict of a jury that had deducted the
proceeds of the resale from the contract price when calculating the seller's damages. Smee v. Huddles-
tone (1768), reprinted in J. SAYER, THE LAW OF DAMAGES 49 (Dublin 1792); see also P. ATIYAH,
THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 210 (1979) ("[I]t may be that in practice the rules
about independent covenants were made tolerable by the common sense of juries.").
39. When account was taken not only of the cost to the plaintiff of rendering the return perform-
ance but also of the possibility of mitigation by the plaintiff's disposing of that performance else-
where-as where a seller can resell the goods on the market after the buyer's breach-the familiar
damage rules based on market price evolved. Atiyah uses "expectation damages" in this narrow sense.
[I]n the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries . . . the damages [the plaintiff] was entitled to
claim represented the frll value of the defendant's promise .. . .Although it is possible to
say that damages in such a case are given in compensation for the plaintiff's lost expectations
(as Professor Simpson does) these are not expectation damages in the modem sense. In modern
law, such damages are called expectation damages because the only ground upon which a
plaintiff appears to be entitled to damages at all is that he has suffered a disappointment of his
expectations. . ....
P. ATIYAH, supra note 38, at 200 (emphasis in original). Atiyah's use of "expectation damages" in
the narrow sense suits his thesis that reliance is the key element in imposing liability for breach of
contract, but it is not in accord with the general usage of the term "expectation interest" in the United
States, as reflected in RESTATEmr (SECOND) OF CONRACTS § 344(a) (1981).
40. But see Flureau v. Thornhill, 2 Black. W. 1078, 96 Eng. Rep. 635 (C.P. 1776) (limiting
recovery against seller who contracted to convey land but was unable in good faith to make title to
expense incurred by purchaser in reliance on promise). In a disdainful reference to the expectation
measure, De Grey, C.J., remarked that the purchaser was not "entitled to any damages for the fan-
cied goodness of the bargain, which he supposes he has lost." 2 Black W. at 1078, 96 Eng. Rep. at
635. The lack of any further discussion of the measure of damages is consistent with the historical
judicial disinclination to delve into any matter that has been relegated to juries for centuries.
41. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. I & 2), 46 YALE L.J.
52, 373 (1936-1937) (reliance interest is better gauge of remedy for contract breach than "all or
nothing" recovery).
42. See Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle:
Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554,
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compensatory" damages are necessary in order adequately to protect the
plaintiff's expectation.43 Some even argue, in a quantum jump, for replac-
ing any payment of damages with universal specific performance.44
The second approach, measures damages not by the loss to the injured
party but by the gain to the party in breach. In 1959, John Dawson pro-
posed that
an alternative form of money judgment remedy . . could be used
wherever the delivery of a specific asset or a defined course of action
(a "service") had been promised and through breach and resale to
another the promisor was enabled to secure a readily measured gain.
It may well be that the obstacle is nothing more than that well-
known ailment of lawyers, a hardening of the categories. 45
What precedent is there for this disgorgement principle? All its advo-
cates rely, at least by way of analogy, on a few instances in which the
principle has long been accepted. These instances fall into two categories:
those involving fiduciaries, and those involving the liability of sellers of
goods and land." We turn first to the recognition of the disgorgement
principle in cases within those two categories and then to the more general
recognition of the principle.
557 (1977) ("The proof problems inherent in fully recovering idiosyncratic values within the context
of operationally practical damage sanctions may prevent the non-breaching party from recovering his
subjective expectations if recovery is limited to legally determined remedies."); see also Kronman,
Specific Performance, 45 U. OHi. L. REv. 351, 363 (1978) ("Whenever a court calculates money
damages, there is some risk that it will undercompensate the injured party.").
43. On "super-compensatory" damages, see Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Com-
pensatory Damages for Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REv. 1443, 1444-45 (1980) ("To the extent
that every prospective plaintiff is not fully compensated, even though 'compensatory' damages are
awarded in every litigated case, contracts are underenforced."); see also Marschall, Willfulness: A
Crucial Factor in Choosing Remedies for Breach of Contract, 24 ARiz. L. REv. 733, 760 (1982)
(urging that "knowing breacher should be discouraged from future breaches by . . .either specific
performance or the highest possible measure of expectation damages"); Yorio, In Defense of Money
Damages for Breach of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1365 (1982) (advocating damages based on cost
of completion).
44. Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restate-
ment, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 138 (1981) (advocating "general use of specific performance" in place
of system that fails to count "unquantifiable emotional and other costs of nonperformance to the
promisee"); Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 306 (1979) (if "law is
committed to putting disappointed promisees in as good a position as they would have been had their
promisors performed, specific performance should be available as a matter of course . . ").
45. Dawson, supra note 8, at 186-87; accord 1 G. PALMER, supra note 14, § 4.9(c), at 446.
46. In addition to Dawson and Palmer, advocates of some form of the disgorgement principle
include Daniel Friedmann, see Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the Appropria-
tion of Property or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 504 (1980) (analogizing to
property); Robert Goff and Gareth Jones, see R. GOFF & G. JONES, THE LAW OF REsTrrTION 490
(2d ed. 1978) (same); Duncan Kennedy, see Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudi-
cation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685, 1717, 1734 (1976) (analogizing to fiduciaries); J.C. Shepherd, see J.
SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES (1981) (same); and Roberto Unger, see Unger, The Critical
Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 561, 641 (1983) (same); see also Jones, supra note 9, at
459-60 (more limited proposal).
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B. Recognition in Particular Instances
1. Fiduciaries
Suppose that under our contract for a sale of a widget, I hold the wid-
get for you as your "fiduciary," but I sell it to another buyer in breach of
my fiduciary duty. Since my breach was a breach of a fiduciary duty and
not a mere breach of contract, a court will apply the disgorgement princi-
ple.4 7 The origins of this rule go back to the seventeenth century, when
equitable interests were revived in the form of trusts. A trustee undertakes
both a duty of care and a duty of loyalty. The duty of care requires care
proportioned to the occasion.4" The duty of loyalty is more demanding; it
requires the trustee to subordinate selfish interest to the interest of the
beneficiary in case of conflict."9 In the situations that concern us, it in-
cludes a duty not to profit at the beneficiary's expense.
In 1726, the landmark English case of Keech v. Sandford50 made it
dear that the duty of loyalty would be strictly enforced where a trustee
entered into a transaction with a third party. A trustee held a lease of the
profits of a business for the benefit of an infant. When the trustee sought
to renew the lease on behalf of the trust, the lessor refused to renew it but
leased to the trustee personally. The court decreed that the trustee held
the lease in trust for the infant and had to account for any profits. Lord
Chancellor King observed that, though the trustee may have been innocent
of any wrongful intent, "if a trustee, on the refusal to renew, might have a
lease to himself, few trust-estates would be renewed to cestui que use."'51
Today the rules developed for trustees have been extended, with suita-
ble variations, to a wide variety of "fiduciaries."52 The term is relatively
47. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 138 (1937); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESri-
TUTION, § 4 comment b (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983) (restitution may provide greater recovery than
would tort or other thories in cases of interference with duty owed).
48. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 (1958) (paid agent must "act with
standard care and with the skill which is standard in the locality for the kind of work which he is
employed to perform and . . . to exercise any special skill that he has"; gratuitous agent must "act
with the care and skill which is required of persons not agents performing similar gratuitous under-
takings for others") with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959) (trustee must "exercise
such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property").
49. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958) (duty "to act solely for the
benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his agency") with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 170 (1959) (duty "to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary" and, in
dealing on trustee's account, "to deal fairly [with the beneficiary] and to communicate to him all
material facts . . ").
50. 25 Eng. Rep. 223 (1726).
51. Id. at 223.
52. According to Sealy, the term became established in English law reports in the middle of the
last century, when it was used to describe "situations which fell short of the . . . strictly-defined
trust." Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, [1962] CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 71-72; see also P. FINN, Supra
note 31, at 1 ("The term itself is a relative latecomer to the vocabulary of English law."); R. GoFF &
G. JONES, supra note 46, at 490 ("English judges have wisely never attempted to formulate a com-
prehensive definition of who is a fiduciary."). As used in the United States, the term includes trustees.
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recent and includes not only trustees but also agents, partners, joint ad-
venturers, guardians, attorneys, and corporate officers and directors. 3 We
may simply define a fiduciary as a person who undertakes to act so as to
serve the interest of some other person in some particular matter or mat-
ters.54 Not every duty owed by a "fiduciary" is a fiduciary duty; some
duties owed by fiduciaries are simple contract duties.55
To characterize an obligor as a "fiduciary" has distinctive consequences
that are remedial as well as substantive. The distinctive substantive conse-
quence is that the obligor is bound by a duty of loyalty; the distinctive
remedial consequence is that the obligor who violates the duty of loyalty
must disgorge the resulting gain. Thus in Keech v. Sandford, the trustee
who had violated his duty of loyalty was required to give up the renewed
lease and the profits from it. Under the expectation principle, the trustee
would not have been liable because the beneficiary would have been no
better off had the trustee observed his duty of loyalty. But under the dis-
gorgement principle, the trustee was required to surrender his gain even
though it had not come at the beneficiary's expense. 6
The substantive duty of loyalty imposed on a fiduciary is similar to the
duty of good faith imposed on a party to a contract. Both duties may
require one to act against one's selfish interest.57 Although the contract
duty of good faith is less exigent, it can be made more demanding by
53. Courts have sometimes found relationships to be of a fiduciary character even where the rela-
tionships do not fall into particular categories. See Wheeler v. Waler, 197 N.W. 2d 585, 587 (Iowa
1972) (duty of good faith "not limited to the familiar categories such as partnership, joint venture, and
agency; it permeates the law wherever a relationship of trust and confidence exists"); see also Broom-
field v. Kosow, 349 Mass. 749, 757, 212 N.E.2d 556, 561 (1965) (relationship of "trust and confi-
dence" growing out of "close business relationship and business friendship" was fiduciary one).
54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 comment a (1958); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 2 comment b (1959); Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALF. L. REv. 539 (1949).
55. For example, "the agent's liability for profits made by his use of the principal's assets does not
include a liability for profits made by him during hours which he should have devoted to the princi-
pal's service, unless he has thereby violated a fiduciary duty owed by him to the principal." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 404 comment b (1958). See P. FINN, supra note 31, at 1 ("[I]t is
pointless to describe a person . . . as being a fiduciary unless at the same time it is said for the
purposes of which particular rules and principles that description is being used."); see also SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., for the Court) ("[T]o say that a man is a
fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What
obligations does he owe as a fiduciary?").
56. This is implicit in the holding in Keech v. Sandford, though the court did not address the
issue. See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969) (corpo-
rate officers and directors may be required to disgorge gains in transactions in corporation's stock
resulting from use of inside information even though they cause corporation no injury).
57. For a simple example, consider the contract cases that impose a duty to cooperate with the
other party even when selfish interest may dictate otherwise. E.g., Patterson v. Meyerhofer, 204 N.Y.
96, 97 N.E. 472 (1912) (buyer bid against seller at auction where seller was expected to acquire
property that he was to sell to buyer). For statements of the duty of good faith, see UC.C. § 1-203
(1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
Steven Burton appears to regard a fiduciary's duty of loyalty as a version of the duty of good faith.
Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L.
REv. 369, 394-95 & n.109 (1980).
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adding express provisions expanding its scope. In substance both duties
find a place on the same spectrum.
The more significant distinction between fiduciary obligations and con-
tractual ones is remedial-the disgorgement principle applies to breach of
a fiduciary obligation while the expectation principle applies to a breach
of contractual obligation. 58 So singular is this remedial consequence of a
fiduciary obligation that one English judge made the disgorgement princi-
ple the hallmark of a fiduciary relationship: "What is a fiduciary relation-
ship? It is one in respect of which if a wrong arise, the same remedy
exists against the wrong-doer on behalf of the principal as would exist
against a trustee on behalf of the cestui que trust." 59
Acceptance of the disgorgement principle raised the question of causa-
tion, for a fiduciary could be asked to disgorge only those benefits that
resulted from the breach of fiduciary duty. The question of causation was
especially troublesome if a trustee mingled trust funds with personal funds
in a trade or business. The early English cases had held that in such a
case the beneficiary could claim only interest on the trust funds.60 Al-
though seventeenth-century judges did not express these holdings in terms
of cause, they were in effect applying a strict requirement of cause in fact
in determining the trustee's gain. Absent a breach of trust, the trustee
could have obtained the additional funds for the trade or business only by
borrowing at interest. The trustee's gain was therefore what the trustee
saved by not having to borrow. And interest on the trust funds measured
this gain in terms of saving of the cost of substitution.
Until Docker v. Somes,6 1 decided in 1834, the precedents had not gone
beyond granting of interest as the measure of damages. In Docker v.
Somes, Lord Brougham for the court gave a beneficiary a right to a share
of the profits of the trade or business in even this troublesome situation.
Winding up Somes's shipping business, the trustees appointed under his
will received money that they then used in their own business, charging
themselves interest at five percent, which they claimed was a higher rate
than they could have obtained elsewhere. The court held, however, that a
trustee must account "for all the gain which he has made,""2 and the
trustees should therefore be charged with the proportion of the profits
from their business that "was properly attributable to the monies so to be
58. This distinction has occasionally been overlooked in analogizing from fiduciary to contractual
relations. See Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089, 1126-30
(1981) (discussing substantive but not remedial aspects of analogy).
59. Ex parte Dale & Co., 11 Oh. D. 772, 778 (1879).
60. See, e.g., Ratcliffe v. Graves, 23 Eng. Rep. 409 (1683) (administratrix controlling intestate's
estate for use in trade must account for interest earned).
61. 39 Eng. Rep. 1095 (Oh. 1834).
62. Id. at 1098.
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considered as employed in their trades."63 Where it is easy to tell what the
gains are, the trustee must account for the actual gains.
The reason which has induced Judges to be satisfied with allowing
interest only I take to have been this: they could not easily sever the
profits attributable to the trust money from those belonging to the
whole capital stock; and the process became still more difficult,
where a great proportion of the gains proceeded from skill or labour
employed upon the capital. In cases of separate appropriation there
was no such difficulty; as where land or stock had been bought and
then sold again at a profit; and here, accordingly, there was no hesi-
tation in at once making the trustee account for the whole gains he
had made. 4
Gone was the strict requirement of cause in fact; little matter that the
trustees saved no more that five percent by using the trust funds.65 Little
matter too that the skill, industry, and capital of the trustees may have
been a joint cause of the profits that they were required to disgorge.
However appropriate such rules may be for fiduciary relations, they
seem oversolicitous of your interests when applied to our contract for the
sale of a widget. The rules that limit the discretion of the trustee are
intended to protect both the beneficiary and the public in ways inappro-
priate to ordinary commercial dealings. 6
Consider, for example, the restraints on modification. A party to a con-
tract needs only to observe good faith in negotiating a modification of the
contractual relation, but a modification of a fiduciary relation is voidable
unless it is on fair terms and agreed to by the beneficiary after full disclo-
sure by the fiduciary.67 Such restraints on modification, which serve to
63. Id. at 1095.
64. Id. at 1098-99. Lord Brougham noted that limiting recovery to interest ignored the hazards to
which the trustee had exposed the funds. Id. at 1099.
65. On this last point the Chancellor made a small concession by distinguishing cases in which the
gain was almost entirely from the trustee's "skillful labour," as in "the case of trust money laid out in
purchasing a piece of steel or skein of silk, and these being worked up into goods of the finest fabric,
Birmingham trinkets or Brussels lace, where the work exceeds by 10,000 times the material in value."
Id. at 1099.
66. See Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 816 (1983) ("Fiduciary relations pre-
sent a problem because a fiduciary holds a delegated power that is susceptible to abuse."); Weinrib,
The Fiduciay Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 4 (1975) ("The need to control discretion has
been a justification for the imposition of the harsh rule concerning fiduciaries since the beginning.");
see also J. SHEPHERD, supra note 46, at 83-88 (discussing theories that define fiduciary relationship
in terms of fiduciary's "power and discretion" over principal's interests). Discretion is so integral to
the fiduciary relation that it has been held that there is no trust relation if no discretion is accorded
the person in charge of funds. Cohen v. Hughes, 38 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1942), affd
mem., 266 A.D. 658, 41 N.Y.S.2d 210, affd mem., 291 N.Y. 698, 52 N.E.2d 591 (1943). But for a
case upholding a trust under which the settlor gave the trustee little discretion, see Farkas v. Wil-
liams, 5 I11. 2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955).
67. For the contract rule, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 89, 205 (1981);
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protect beneficiaries from abuse of discretion by fiduciaries, would inhibit
ordinary commercial dealings. Consider, too, the restraints on commin-
gling property. A party to a contract is free to commingle property, but
the trustee is under a duty to keep the trust funds separate from the trus-
tee's own funds.6 8 The inconvenience of a requirement of segregation in
connection with contracts makes the fiduciary analogy unattractive.8 9
Furthermore, the law of fiduciary relations, unlike that of contractual
relations, is distinctively concerned with deterrence and ethical stan-
dards.7 0 While the American Bar Association's newly adopted Model
Rules of Professional Conduct leave a lawyer free to advise a client to
break a contract, they cast doubt on the propriety of a lawyer's advising a
client to violate a fiduciary duty.71 While courts will not grant punitive
damages for breach of contract, they may award them for the breach of a
fiduciary obligation. 72 And while courts in some instances will not impose
criminal liability for breach of contract, they may impose it for breach of a
fiduciary obligation." But the main drawback of the fiduciary analogy is
U.C.C. § 2-209 comment 2 (1978). As for fiduciaries, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
173 (1981) requires such disclosure as will give "all parties beneficially interested . . . full under-
standing of their legal rights and of all relevant facts that the fiduciary knows or should know."
68. P. FINN, supra note 31, at 103. Indeed, it is this very requirement that makes it possible to
determine that a particular profit has resulted from the misappropriation of trust funds instead of the
proper use of the trustee's own funds.
69. Finn points out that, in many types of commercial transactions, the inconvenience of the re-
quirement that the trustee maintain a separate trust account "affords a significant policy reason
against finding a trusteeship." P. FINN, supra note 31, at 100. Of course, not all fiduciary relations
involve property, but the disgorgement principle does not apply to such relations. Cf. In re Interstate
Record Distribs. 307 F. Supp. 1142, 1144 (S.D.N.Y.) (agent, as distinguished from trustee, was mere
debtor), aff'd, 430 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1970).
70. See Berenson v. Nirenstein, 326 Mass. 285, 288, 93 N.E.2d 610, 612 (1950) (fiduciary obliga-
tions rest "upon fundamental principles of business morality and honor which are of the highest
public interest"); Friedmann, supra note 46, at 558 ("[Like punitive damages, deterrent restitution
ought generally to be confined to exceptional circumstances involving breach of fiduciary duty or
conduct that is morally reprehensible."); Weinrib, supra note 66, at 11 (fiduciary obligation is ele-
ment of the common law for protection of business structures).
71. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (1983) ("lawyer shall not counsel a
client to engage. . . in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent"). The comment says
that if the client is a fiduciary, "the lawyer may be charged with special obligations in dealings with a
beneficiary." The comment in the final draft was more specific and said: "[WIhere the client is a
fiduciary, and therefore charged with special obligations of honesty in dealings with a beneficiary, the
lawyer's obligations to avoid assisting in fraudulent conduct is correlative." The result was presuma-
bly the same under the old Model Code. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIaY DR
7-102 (A)(7) (1981) (forbidding lawyer to "[c]ounsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer
knows to be illegal or fraudulent"). Under the old Model Code, this "illegal" conduct probably did
not include breach of contract. Hazard, How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally
Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 669, 674-75, 682 (1981).
72. See Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1958); see also Sullivan, Punitive Damages in
the Law of Contract: The Reality and the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REv. 207, 226-29
(1977) (discussing cases). The subject of punitive measures against trustees has come into prominence
as a result of In re Rothko, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 372 N.E.2d 291, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977). See Wellman,
Punitive Surcharge Against Disloyal Fiduciaries-Is Rothko Right? 77 MICH. L. REv. 95 (1978)
(criticizing award of punitive damages against trustees for fiduciary breach).
73. Criminal liability has been imposed for private fiduciary breach under the federal mail fraud
1358
Disgorgement Principle
that it unrelentingly applies the disgorgement principle to reach a propor-
tional share of all profits, with little regard to questions of cause in fact,
joint cause, or remote cause.7
Snepp v. United States,75 in which the Supreme Court applied fiduci-
ary law to a case involving a breach of contract, illustrates the shortcom-
ings of the fiduciary analogy. Snepp had made an employment contract
with the Central Intelligence Agency, including a commitment not to pub-
lish any information relating to the Agency without prepublication clear-
ance. Had this been a mere breach of contract, the CIA would have been
unable to show damages under the expectation principle with sufficient
certainty. The CIA, however, asserted that Snepp had broken a fiduci-
ary duty, not merely a contractual duty, and sought to recover the profits
from his book, which the CIA claimed Snepp had gained as a result of his
breach. The Supreme Court agreed, characterizing Snepp's duty as fiduci-
ary and concluding that Snepp should therefore be required "to disgorge
the benefits of his faithlessness. 77 The Court failed, however, to address
two questions of cause. First, was Snepp's breach of fiduciary duty the
cause in fact of the profits from his book? If, as may well have been the
case, the CIA could not properly have refused permission had Snepp
sought it, Snepp could have made the same profits without breach; the
essential causal link was not demonstrated. Second, to what extent were
Snepp's own skill and industry the cause of his profits? With no attempt
made to apportion the contributions of the breach and of Snepp's own
statute, which makes it a crime to use the mails or wires in furtherance of "any scheme or artifice to
defraud." 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). See Coffee, From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the
Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 Am.
CRIM. L. REv. 117 (1981).
74. The harsh rule of Docker v. Somes refuses to apportion profits even though they may have
resulted in part from the fiduciary's skill, industry, or capital. Occasionally, however, where the fidu-
ciary's contribution has been services of a kind that can be compensated by a sum of money, that sum
has been subtracted from the beneficiary's claims. Thus a fiduciary who manages a business using
misapplied funds as capital may be compensated by an allowance for the reasonable value of such
services. Greenan v. Ernst, 408 Pa. 495, 184 A.2d 570 (1962); Brooks v. Conston, 364 Pa. 256, 72
A.2d 75 (1950). This solution will not often be useful in the kinds of cases I am discussing. It would
be useful, however, in the case of the widget resold with the profit traced into a business.
75. 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
76. The district court found that the government's injury was "not quantifiable with any reasona-
ble degree of certainty." United States v. Snepp, 456 F. Supp. 176, 181 (E.D. Va. 1978). The court of
appeals indicated that punitive damages might be appropriate, United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926,
936-38 (4th Cir. 1979), but was reversed on this point, 444 U.S. 507, 514-16 (1980) (per curiam).
77. 444 U.S. at 515. The Supreme Court assumed that the parties had the power to make the
duty a fiduciary one by agreement, noting that in the opening sentence of his agreement with the CIA,
in which Snepp recited "I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency," he "explicitly recog-
nized that he was entering a trust relationship." Id. at 510 & n.5.
It seems clearer that it is open to the parties to prevent a fiduciary relationship from arising. E.g.,
Midcon Oil & Gas and New British Dominion Oil Co., 1958 S.C.R. 314, 323 (Can.) ("[Piarties in
terms provided that the relationship existing between them . . . was neither partnership nor that of
principal and agent."); see also Jirna Ltd. v. Mister Donut of Canada Ltd., 40 D.L.R.3d 303, 305
(Can. 1973) (court to rely on other parties' definition of their relationship).
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efforts and talents, Snepp was denied any compensation whatsoever from
his writing."
Partly to solve the problem of apportionment, advocates of the fiduciary
analogy such as Roberto Unger point to the joint venture, a vaguely de-
fined business association similar to a partnership but often less formal
and narrower in purpose and scope."9 As in a partnership, there is a fea-
ture of adventure in that its members share both profits and losses.80 Fur-
thermore, since Cardozo's landmark opinion in Meinhard v. Salmon, the
strict rules applicable to fiduciaries clearly have extended to joint ventur-
ers, who "owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the duty of
the finest loyalty."81 One venturer must not derive a separate, personal
profit from a transaction within the scope of the venture; the venturer who
violates this duty is subject to disgorgement.
To view a contract as a joint venture, however, requires that one ignore
the opposing nature of the parties' interests that is so characteristic of a
contract. For example, in the contract for a sale of a widget, the seller
takes the risk that the market in widgets will rise and the buyer takes the
risk that it will fall. Rules developed for joint ventures also pose obvious
problems when extended to contractual relationships. How does one de-
termine each party's share of any gains resulting from a breach of con-
tract: What are our respective shares in the $25 profit on resale? Half and
half? Or some other shares that would ultimately be determined by a
court in its discretion? Another problem is how to implement the corollary
burden of sharing losses: What happens if it turns out that it will cost me
$25 more than anticipated to produce or acquire the widget? Can I call
upon you to pay some part of that increase? And if so, what part? 2 The
difficulties inherent in the fiduciary analogy have prompted most advo-
cates of the disgorgement principle to seek other analogies.
2. Sellers
a. Property as a Basis. Under our contract for the sale of a widget,
suppose that the widget has already become "your property," though I
still have possession of it, when I sell it to the other buyer. You can re-
78. See 444 U.S. at 521 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. See Unger, supra note 46, at 642; see also I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRAcr 27-28
(1980) (image of joint venture evoked by references to "sharing . . .benefits and burdens"). A joint
interest in property is usually required. See Pfleider v. Smith, 370 P.2d 17, 20 (Okla. 1962).
80. See Rollins v. Rayhill, 200 Okla. 192, 195-96, 191 P.2d 934, 937-38 (1948) (no joint venture
because no right to share profits).
81. 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
82. See Shrum v. Simpson, 155 Ind. 160, 164, 57 N.E. 708, 709 (1900) (agricultural agreement
involving sharing of farm products gave rise to relationship of agency and not of joint venture; declin-
ing to presume that parties intended to assume "intricate responsibilities of partners").
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cover the entire $25 from me. Because the widget was "yours" at the time
of my resale, a court will apply the disgorgement principle.
The result may accord with the widely held notion that if something is
"your property," your rights in it are entitled to a special measure of
protection. But courts arrived at this result by a strikingly formalistic
chain of reasoning. If you authorize me to sell "your" widget as your
agent and I do so, the disgorgement principle applies, and I am liable to
you for any proceeds beyond the $100 price. If you do not authorize me to
sell "your" widget but I sell it purporting to act as your agent, the dis-
gorgement principle also applies; though I am liable to you for conversion
of your property, you can ratify my wrongful act and recover from me in
assumpsit for money had and received. The challenge is then to extend the
disgorgement principle to the case where I do not even purport to act as
your agent, for in that case, you cannot rectify my wrongful sale.
Two decades before Keech v. Sandford, Lamine v. Dorrell"8 invented
the doctrine of waiver of tort and suit in assumpsit. The established law
held that, for selling "your" widget without your authority, I was liable to
you in tort for the conversion of your property; Lamine v. Dorrell added
the proposition that even absent purported agency, you can "waive" the
tort and sue in assumpsit for money had and received.84 It was, of course,
the baldest of fictions that permitted an owner whose goods had been
wrongfully sold to "dispense with the wrong and suppose the sale made
by his consent" when it was the wrong that made the other's enrichment
unjust. But by this fiction, the disgorgement principle could be extended to
the case of a seller who, after goods had already become the property of
the buyer, resold them to another buyer. Thus, if I resell "your" widget
for $125, I must disgorge my entire $25 gain.
Today your recovery is thought of as restitutionary, grounded in my
having enriched myself by committing a wrong against you.85 In theory,
83. 92 Eng. Rep. 303 (1705).
84. As Justice Powell explained, "the plaintiff may dispense with the wrong, and suppose the sale
made by his consent, and bring an action for the money they were sold for, as money received to his
use." Id. The decision has a suspect pedigree. Its antecedents were cases in which a plaintiff who was
entitled to an office was allowed to recover in assumpsit the fees that the defendant had collected while
usurping the office. In Lamine v. Dorrell, Chief Justice Holt remarked, "These actions have crept in
by degrees," though he could not distinguish them. Id. at 303-04.
In Arris v. Stukely, 86 Eng. Rep. 1060, 1060-62 (1677), the defendant argued that "indebitatus
assumpsit will not lie. . . because there is no contract." But the plaintiff replied that "though it is a
tort yet an indebitatus will lie," for because of the receipt of the profits, "the law creates a promise."
The Court of Exchequer agreed with the plaintiff and analogized to liability for rent received by one
who pretends a title.
This was a questionable analogy, as is explained in R. GOFF & G. JONES, supra note 46, at 446.
Therefore, in Howard v. Wood, 83 Eng. Rep. 540 (1656) (the only precedent cited in Lamine v.
Dorrell), the Court of King's Bench followed the Court of Exchequer only grudgingly.
85. See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF REsrrrsmoN § 4 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983) ("A person
may be unjustly enriched by receiving a benefit from conduct in violation of a duty owed. . . by him
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that recovery will be measured by the gain to me, even though it exceeds
the loss to you. In practice, since courts measure the loss in a conversion
action so generously,86  my gain will only rarely exceed your loss.87 In
deciding these cases, courts have been oblivious to the question of cause in
fact, just as they have been in cases involving fiduciaries.
What of the case in which, instead of selling "your" widget to another
buyer, I keep it for my own use or consumption, having concluded that it
is worth $125 to me? At first, courts balked at such an extension of the
doctrine of waiver of tort. 8 As Lord Mansfield expressed it, an action for
money had and received to the plaintiffs use "will not lie . . where no
money was received."89 Other courts stretched the rule to cover this situa-
tion, however, and allowed recovery of the value of the converted property
by using yet another fiction, that the goods had been sold by their owner
to the converter, and this is now the preferred view.90 Thus if I keep
"your" widget, the disgorgement principle applies; if the value of the wid-
get is $125, I am liable for the entire $25. If there is a market for widgets,
the value will be the market price, consistent with the fiction of a sale to
the converter. 1 This is the converter's gain in terms of saving of the cost
of substitution. If there is no market for widgets, the value will be pre-
sumably the amount that a willing seller in the circumstances of the
owner and a willing buyer in the circumstances of the converter would
* .. ."); see also Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit, 19 YALE L.J. 221, 246 (1910) ("In
jurisdictions where the old forms of action have been totally abolished, there should be nothing
whatever left of the whole doctrine excepting a few historical echoes.").
86. On the several possible measures of recovery for conversion, see D. DOBBS, supra note 31,
§ 5.14. In a jurisdiction that awards the most generous measure, i.e., the highest market price reached
between the date of conversion and the date of the trial, a claim for restitution would be advantageous
in amount only if the converter sold for more than the highest market price. But in a jurisdiction that
follows the "New York rule" and awards the highest market price between the date the owner had
notice of conversion and a reasonable time for replacement thereafter, a claim for restitution would
also be advantageous in amount if the market was high when the converter sold and then fell before
the owner had notice of conversion.
87. Plaintiffs who have relied on the doctrines of waiver or tort have usually done so in order to
get the procedural advantages of an action sounding in contract rather than to get a more favorable
measure of recovery. Nevertheless, in these conversion cases, the applicability of the disgorgement
principle is firmly established. For a discussion of the procedural significance of the doctrine, includ-
ing the effect on the statute of limitations, see Corbin, supra note 85, at 234-46.
88. This limitation is often called the rule of Jones v. Hoar, after Jones v. Hoar, 22 Mass. (5
Pick.) 285 (1827).
89. Nightingal v. Devisme, 98 Eng. Rep. 361, 363 (1770). On the present vitality of this view in
England, see R. GOFF & G. JONES, supra note 46, at 470-71.
90. See Conaway v. Pepper, 30 Del. (7 Boyce) 511, 515, 108 A. 676, 678 (1919) ("[Elvery reason
for allowing a recovery in assumpsit. . . will apply with equal force, to a case for the recovery of the
fair value of the property, upon a count for goods sold and delivered, where the property is not sold,
but retained or consumed .... "). See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 128 comment h (1937); 1
G. PALMER, supra note 14, § 2.2, at 55.
91. See Felder v. Reeth, 34 F.2d 744, 747-48 (9th Cir. 1929) (use of market price less costs of
transportation to determine value of property).
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have agreed on, again consistent with the fiction of a sale to the converter.
This is the converter's gain in terms of saving of the cost of modification.
As has already been pointed out, a person who has tortiously deprived
the owner of goods that have been returned later is under a duty to make
restitution to the owner for the value of their use, with value determined
in terms of the saving of the cost of other means in a similar fashion. 92
Thus the disgorgement principle can be extended to use for a limited time,
and applies in the situation in which I merely delay delivering "your"
widget to you, as well as in situations in which I resell it to another or
keep it for my own use or consumption.
Advocates of the disgorgement principle have urged that its applicabil-
ity be extended by analogy beyond the conversion cases. Robert Goff and
Gareth Jones, in their definitive treatment of the English law of restitu-
tion, remark that "[a]s yet the analogy of the cases on waiver of tort has
not persuaded the courts to allow the plaintiff to waive a breach of con-
tract and to reach the profits made from that breach." But they regard
this restriction as "a product of history" that "can produce anomalous and
unjust results" and add that "the recognition of a restitutionary right to
recover profits which are the product of the breach would deter the cyni-
cal contract breaker.""3
92. Fanson v. Linsley, 20 Kan. 235 (1878); Jansen v. Dolan, 157 Mo. App. 32, 137 S.W. 27
(1911); ef. Paar v. City of Prescott, 59 Ariz. 497, 130 P.2d 40 (1942) (use of private water system
consisting of thousands of feet of pipe). These cases implicitly reject the rule of Jones v. Hoar. Courts
have traditionally been less willing to require restitution in cases involving the use of land. See 1 G.
PALMER, supra note 14, § 2.5, at 74-80. The older view is stated in the RESTATEMENT OF REsTrru-
TION § 129 (1937).
93. R. GOFF & G. JONES, supra note 46, at 20, 371. For a fuller discussion of limited extension
of the disgorgement principle, see Jones, supra note 9. Daniel Friedmann has argued that restitution
should be allowed if the promisee is "entitled" to the promised performance "in such a way that if
this performance is withheld, appropriated, or otherwise 'taken,' the promisee can be regarded as
having been deprived of an interest that 'belonged' to him." See Friedmann, supra note 46, at 515.
There are two flaws in this approach. First, it takes interests that are not commonly thought of as
property or even as similar to property and characterizes them as property or "quasi-property" in
order to reach a desired result. Second, the approach gives little guidance and leads to apparently
inconsistent conclusions. Why is the concept of property being extended? And how far should we
extend it? Furthermore, the attractiveness of this property analogy, like that of the fiduciary analogy,
is diminished because of the measure of recovery generally allowed. At least in cases involving resale
by a conscious wrongdoer, the measure of recovery is as generous as that available for breach of a
fiduciary duty. See D. DOBBS, supra note 31, at 242-43; Oestere, Deficiencies of the Restitutionary
Right to Trace Misappropriated Property in Equity and in UCC § 9-306, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 172,
219 (1983).
Friedmann himself admits that his approach "does not itself provide a means of determining
whether a particular interest ought to be recognized as property" and that "any reasoning to the effect
that an interest should be deemed property in order to prevent unjust enrichment would be circular."
Friedmann, supra, at 557.
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b. Specific Relief as a Basis
Suppose that the widget is "unique" or that for some other reason a
court would grant you specific performance of the contract. In such in-
stances, a court could apply the disgorgement principle and allow you to
recover the entire $25. How is recovery on this ground to be explained?
The earliest cases of disgorgement involve contracts for the sale of land,
where specific performance was commonly available."" Because land is in-
volved, recovery of the seller's profit might be based on the expectation
principle on the ground that, had the seller performed and conveyed the
land to the buyer, the second buyer would still have found and bought it
at the higher price. The result, although consistent with the expectation
principle, is grounded in the disgorgement principle. The traditional rea-
soning is that because of the right to specific performance, the buyer ac-
quires an equitable interest in the land at the moment the contract is
made, so that the seller holds the land as "trustee" for the buyer until title
passes.9 5 The disgorgement principle then applies as it does to any
trustee.96
This notion that the seller of land holds it as "trustee" for the buyer
would, if taken literally, lead to extraordinary results by subjecting the
seller to all of the restraints imposed on a trustee. For example, an at-
tempt to modify the contract of sale would be scrutinized under the rules
applicable to fiduciary relations.97 Modern authority rejects the notion
that the seller is "trustee" or, indeed, that there is any fiduciary relation-
ship between the parties. And though the cases that require the seller to
disgorge the gain commonly use trust terminology, they can be read as
holding only that the court will impose a constructive trust on the pro-
ceeds of the sale, in aid of a buyer's right to restitution. One conse-
quence of imposing a constructive trust on the proceeds is to reject a strict
94. In this situation the disgorgement principle is well established (assuming that the second
buyer is a good faith purchaser who can keep the land, so that the first buyer's only recourse is a
damage action against the seller) even though the waiver of tort doctrine did not apply since land
cannot be the subject of conversion. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (1965) (conver-
sion defined as "an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel").
95. See Green v. Smith, 26 Eng. Rep. 360 (1738) ("[Tihe vendor of the estate is, from the time of
his contract, considered as a trustee for the purchaser.") (emphasis in original); 1 J. STORY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 789 (2d ed. Boston 1839) (1st ed., Boston 1836).
96. See, e.g., Timko v. Useful Homes Corp., 114 N.J. Eq. 433, 434, 168 A. 824, 824 (1933)
(seller "held the lots in trust" for buyers); Taylor v. Kelly, 56 N.C. 240, 245 (1857) (seller "held the
land as trustee" and "cestui que use may . . . have the price" on sale).
97. See supra text accompanying note 77.
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 48, § 13 (1959); 1 A. Scorr, LAW OF
TRuSTS § 13, at 141 (3d ed. 1967) ("It is clear that. . . the vendor. . . is not in a fiduciary relation
to the purchaser. The vendor in entering into further transactions with the purchaser is under no duty
to make full disclosure to him."); see also D. WATERS, THE CONSTRUCrvE TRusT 74-143 (1964)
(vendor-purchaser relation in English law).
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requirement of cause in fact and give the buyer a right to the seller's
profits. It has accordingly been held that if the proceeds are used to buy
other land, the measure of disgorgement is the value of that other land."9
The possibility of extending this basis for restitution has not gone unno-
ticed.100 As a first step, the reasoning for requiring disgorgement in the
sale of land cases could be extended to sale of goods cases where, because
of uniqueness or for some other reason, the damage remedy is not re-
garded as adequate and specific performance is available to the buyer. 01
This result, however, is less strongly reinforced by the expectation princi-
ple. In contrast to the sale of land cases, it is less likely, even in the case of
unique goods, that, had the seller performed, the buyer would have been
able to resell to the second buyer. In any case, it is doubtful whether such
an extension would give you, as the buyer of my widget, a right to dis-
gorgement in any case where you would not already have such a right
based on conversion. In contrast to contracts for the sale of land, contracts
for the sale of goods often do not specify the goods that are the subject of
the contract. The fact that the widget is not yet identified will not deter a
court from ordering specific performance, but it may prevent you from
proving that the particular widget that I resold at a profit was the widget
that was the subject of the contract. 10 2 This difficulty vanishes once the
widget has been identified, but then you acquire a right to disgorgement
based on conversion. 103 Such a claim, however, is less certain than dis-
gorgement based on specific performance, which still appears to assure to
a buyer of goods the claim to profits that goes along with a constructive
trust. The advantage to you is plain if you can trace the $25 proceeds
from the widget into the stock that I sold for $250, into the land I sold for
$2,500, and into the business worth $25,000.
Robert Sharpe and Stephen Waddams have proposed a more significant
extension of the rule applicable to contracts for the sale of land.104 Accord-
99. See Colby v. Street, 146 Minn. 290, 295-96, 178 N.W. 599, 602 (1920).
100. Dawson saw "no inherent reason why the technique of equity courts in land contract cases
should not be more widely employed, not as a somewhat freakish by-product of a phantom 'trust,' but
as an alternative form of money judgment remedy." Dawson, supra note 8, at 186.
101. 1 G, PALMER, supra note 14, § 4.9, at 443.
102. See U.C.C. § 2-716 comment 2 (1978) (specific performance not "limited to goods which are
already specific or ascertained at the time of contracting"). If, for example, I have two widgets and I
sell one for $110 and the other for $125 but deliver neither to you, you cannot show that my breach
resulted in the sale at the higher price.
103. For a pre-Code case holding that in order for a buyer to recover from a third party in
conversion, the buyer must have property in the goods, see Procter & Gamble Co. v. Peters, White &
Co., 233 N.Y. 97, 134 N.E. 849 (1922). U.C.C. § 2-722 (1978) now governs this situation. The
availability of an action in conversion may account for the absence of sale of goods cases dealing with
the right to disgorgement based on specific performance. This observation does not apply to contracts
for the sale of land, however, since land cannot be the subject of conversion.
104. See Sharpe & Waddams, Damages for Lost Opportunity to Bargain, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STuD. 290 (1982); see also Kronman, supra note 42, at 379 (arguing that limiting the buyer to
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ing to their argument, a party to a contract with a right to compel per-
formance has an opportunity to bargain with the other party using that
right as a bargaining tool. If the other party frustrates that right by
breaking the contract, then that party should be liable for "damages for
lost opportunity to bargain." In order to find liability, the court must con-
struct a hypothetical bargain, one that the parties would have made had
there been no breach. 5 This approach, of course, would lead to damages
equal to gain in terms of saving of the cost of modification.
Sharpe and Waddams, however, fail to consider the possibility that a
court might limit recovery to what the injured party might reasonably
have obtained by negotiating a modification. They would allow damages
equal to the full profit of the party in breach-even though the injured
party could scarcely have succeeded in negotiating such a one-sided bar-
gain-on the ground that the party in breach, "by his own misconduct,
has prevented anyone from knowing how much in fact would have been
paid for the right taken. 106
The case of the negative covenant illustrates the shortcomings of the
Sharpe and Waddams model. Suppose that the seller of a business makes
a valid covenant not to compete with the buyer and then breaks the cove-
nant by operating a competing business. If the buyer claims damages
under the expectation principle, the court will often receive evidence of the
profits that the seller made from the competing business as evidence of the
profits that the buyer lost as a result of the breach.107 But a court will not
assume that the buyer could have made the same sales that the seller did;
the seller's profits are at most only evidence of the buyer's loss under the
expectation principle.10 The buyer would attempt to recover the seller's
profits from the competing business under the disgorgement principle.
Since the buyer would have been entitled to enjoin the seller from compet-
ing, disgorgement can be justified on the ground that the buyer is entitled
to compensation in the amount of the profits for loss of an opportunity to
damages would permit "deliberate conversion of property rules to liability rules"); Schwartz, supra
note 44, at 290 (specific performance should generally be available even where damages would be
more efficient).
105. Cf Note, A Theory of Hypothetical Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 415 (1984) (proposing hypothet-
ical contract for certain cases of restitution).
106. See Sharpe & Waddams, supra note 104, at 296. The authors admit that "a critic might say
...that the presumption is used as a fictitious justification for what should preferably be viewed as a
restitutionary measure," but they defend the result "on a compensatory basis." Id. at 297.
107. Courts differ considerably in their treatment of this question of admissibility. Compare Cin-
cinnati Siemens-Lungren Co. v. Western Siemens-Lungren Gas Illuminating Co., 152 U.S. 200
(1894) (buyer's damages limited to seller's actual profits) with Uinta Oil Ref. Co. v. Ledford, 125
Colo. 429, 244 P.2d 881 (1952) (principal's sales can be used as estimate of agent's damages) and
Buxbaum v. G.H.P. Cigar Co., 188 Wis. 389, 206 N.W. 59 (1925) (if principal is in breach of
exclusive agency agreement, agent may, where principal breaches, use principal's profits as evidence
of agent's loss).
108. See Vermont Elee. Supply Co. v. Andrus, 135 Vt. 190, 373 A.2d 531 (1977).
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bargain, even though there is nothing. comparable to land in which the
buyer can be said to have an "equitable interest."
A New York court held the buyer entitled to disgorgement in just such
a case, Y.J.D. Restaurant Supply Co. v. Dib."'0 After selling his store to
the plaintiff and covenanting not to compete within a five block radius,
the defendant broke the covenant by opening a competing store that he
then sold for $250,000. The defendant admitted that after subtracting the
costs of opening and running the business, he had realized a profit of
$35,000. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover this en-
tire sum, no doubt exceeding the amount that the plaintiff could have
obtained by negotiating a modification, because "the defendant cannot sus-
tain any gain by such willful misconduct on his part.'"' 1 Other courts
have used similar reasoning."'
Use of the promisor's profit to measure the promisor's gain in these
cases is easier to defend if one assumes that, had the promise been per-
formed, the promisee would have made a similar profit. The expectation
principle then reinforces the result. Although courts will not assume that
the promisee's loss equals the promisor's gain when expectation damages
are claimed, they may nevertheless assume a rough equivalence when
measuring gain under the disgorgement principle.
Without such an assumption, a few courts have limited recovery to gain
in terms of saving of the cost of modification as estimated by the court. In
Wrotham Park Estate Co. v. Parkside Homes,: 2 an English case, the
defendants had constructed homes in violation of a restrictive covenant,
but the plaintiffs could not prove that this had diminished the value of
their property. The court concluded that it would not be just to leave the
defendants "in undisturbed possession of the fruits of their wrongdo-
ing"11" and that "a just substitute for a mandatory injunction would be
such a sum of money as might reasonably have been demanded by the
plaintiffs. . . as a quid pro quo for relaxing the covenant," 4 a sum that
the court calculated on the assumption that the defendant would have paid
five percent of the profit that it conceded it made from the development
109. 98 Misc. 2d 462, 413 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
110, Id. at 465, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 837.
111. See, e.g., Deterding v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 214 (Ct. Cl. 1947) (grantee of easement
accountable for profits when it broke contract by claiming rights inconsistent with grantors exclusive
right to oil and gas); Automatic Laundry Serv. v. Demas, 216 Md. 544, 141 A.2d 497 (1958) (son of
owner of trailer park accountable for profits where he was "a knowing participant" in father's
breach); Oscar Barnett Foundry Co. v. Crowe, 80 N.J. Eq. 112, 86 A.2d 915 (1910) (inventor of
patentable invention accountable for profits when it broke contract not to compete with exclusive
licensee). Palmer urges a narrow reading of Deterding and Oscar Barnett. See 1 G. PALMER, supra
note 14, § 4.9, at 446-48 & n.41.
112. [1974] 1 W.L.R. 798.
113. Id. at 812.
114. Id. at 815.
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that violated the covenant."' In Arbutus Park Estates v. Fuller,16 a Ca-
nadian case, the defendants had partially completed a garage in violation
of a covenant requiring them to have plans approved by the plaintiff. The
court allowed damages in the amount that the defendants had saved by
not having an architect draw up plans, an amount estimated to be seven
percent of the construction cost."' There is also an American case, Struc-
tural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research
Corp.,"1' that gave limited recovery based on a reasonable royalty for
breach of a contract not to disclose confidential information, even though
the party in breach had not made a profit.
Equitable relief is more appealing than property as a basis for an ex-
tension of the disgorgement principle. Courts grant equitable relief only if
damages would be inadequate to protect the injured party's expectation
interest." 9 The availability of equitable relief indicates that expectation
damages pose a significant risk of undercompensation; a party who ex-
poses the injured party to such a risk by breaking a contract, and who
then puts equitable relief out of the other party's reach, arguably should
be required to disgorge any gain resulting from the breach. Equitable re-
lief is not, however, available in all situations where expectation damages
pose a significant risk of undercompensating the plaintiff. 20 A party in
breach who has exposed the injured party to a significant risk of un-
dercompensation should be required to disgorge any gain resulting from
the breach, even though there was no right to equitable relief. If disgorge-
ment could be limited to gain in terms of saving of the cost of modifica-
tion, the principle could more easily be extended to such cases of
undercompensation.
115. Id. at 815-16. Though the court evidently regarded this sum as what the injured party lost,
it is also equal to the "fruits" of the builder's wrongdoing if the negotiations are assumed to be
without transaction costs. For a later case in which the court based damages on the assumption that
an owner who built a £75,000 house in violation of a restrictive covenant would have been willing to
pay £72,000 to acquire the right to do so, see Bracewell v. Appleby, [1974] 1 Ch. 408. The argument
that damages should be based on what the party in breach would have been willing to pay was,
however, rejected where no injunctive relief would have been granted in the Ocean Island case. Tito
v. Waddell (No. 2), [19771 1 Oh. 106, 335-36.
No American case appears to have taken this approach, but for a case granting the owner of land in
a subdivision punitive damages in addition to an injunction where the subdivision developed violated
restrictive covenants with respect to resubdivision and building, see Eakman v. Robb, 237 N.W.2d
423 (N.D. 1975), discussed infra text accompanying note 172.
116. 74 D.L.R.3d 257 (B.C. 1976).
117. Id. at 266.
118. 401 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
119. See REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359 (1981); U.C.C. § 2-716 comment 2
(inability to cover is "strong evidence" that specific performance is appropriate). But see Schwartz,
supra note 44, at 271 ("[T]he remedy of specific performance should be as routinely available as the
damages remedy.").
120. See Kronman, supra note 42, at 365 (risk of undercompensation should not be placed on
"someone who is, after all, an innocent victim of his breach").
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3. More General Recognition
The Restatement (Second) of Restitution appears at first to give general
recognition to the disgorgement principle. A section styled "Benefit Ac-
quired Through Wrongful Conduct" gives an injured party a right in
some instances to require the party in breach to disgorge a benefit ac-
quired as a result of a breach of contract: "A person may be unjustly
enriched by receiving a benefit from conduct in violation of a duty owed
either by him or by another." 21 Although, read broadly, this language
might apply to any benefit received as a result of a breach of contract, the
commentary indicates that its scope is more limited. The only examples
given in which the injured party might have such a claim are the two
traditional ones in which the party in breach has committed a tort with
respect to the injured party's property or has committed a breach of a
fiduciary duty. 22
In no jurisdiction do courts generally apply the disgorgement principle.
The decisions containing such statements are widely scattered, do not cite
each other, and show no coherent pattern. Even advocates of the disgorge-
ment principle concede that judicial recognition has been rare. 23 Those
few cases containing broad endorsements of the principle can be explained
on narrower grounds.1 24
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF REsTrruTON § 4 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983). The comparable
provision, § 3, of the RESTATEMENT (FiRsT) OF RESTrrUTION (1937) carried the narrower title
"Tortious Acquisition of a Benefit." It stated the broad principle: "A person is not permitted to profit
by his own wrong at the expense of another." But the commentary admitted that this "principle has
not yet crystallized into a rule since ... it is only in certain types of situations that restitution is
permitted." Id. at § 3 comment a.
122. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF REsTITUTION § 4 comment a (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983).
123. See L. FULLER & M. EisENBERG, BAsic CONTRACT LAW 302 (4th ed. 1981); 1 G.
PALMER, supra note 14, § 4.9, at 438; J. SHEPHERD, supra note 46, at 86; S. WADDAMS, THE LAW
OF DAMAGES 552 (1983); Dawson, supra note 8, at 187.
124. Gassner v. Lockett, 101 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1958), a case cited by advocates of the principle,
involved an action by a purchaser of land against the vendor's estate after the vendor, a forgetful old
man, had sold the land to a third person. The trial court based damages on the difference between the
contract and the market price of the land. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that under
the minority rule followed in Florida, the purchaser would not be entitled to expectation damages
since the forgetful vendor's breach was in good faith. The court held that the purchaser could recover
the vendor's profit on his resale, an amount that was presumably no greater than expectation dam-
ages. The court explained that there was "no reason why the vendor should be allowed to benefit
from such mistake" and that "[e]very rule of logic and justice would seem to indicate" that this
purchaser should recover the profit. Id. at 34. The court cited no authority for this assertion, which
has been cited as a general endorsement of the disgorgement principle. But the holding does not go
beyond the well-established line of cases in other states that have held a vendor liable as constructive
trustee in similar situations.
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III. THE DISGORGEMENT PRINCIPLE AND MARKET DAMAGES
A. When Market Damage Rules Result in Disgorgement
Since contract law takes special notice when establishing damages of
whether goods or services are available on a market, it is of interest to ask
whether application of the disgorgement principle to contracts for these
goods and services can be justified. If not, it would be difficult to recom-
mend that the principle be generally applicable.
1. Usual Effect of Market Damage Rules
Only rarely have courts been faced with situations involving goods or
services available on a market in which a breach results in a gain that
exceeds liability under the expectation principle. Suppose that by the time
for me to deliver the widget to you the market price for widgets rises to
$125, and I then sell the widget to the other buyer for that price. The $25
damages that I will have to pay for your additional cost to replace the
widget will eliminate my $25 profit, leaving me with nothing.
If we assume a competitive market in which the price at which I sell is
the same as the price at which you buy, there is a neat fit between the
market damage rules on the one hand and both the expectation and dis-
gorgement principles on the other. In practice, of course, a market will not
always operate in such a way that your damages will completely eliminate
my profit, even if you buy at the same time that I resell.
2. Discrepancies in Application of Market Damage Rules
The market damage rules are particularly likely to produce discrepan-
cies if a shortage of supply disrupts the market. I may be fortunate
enough to resell for an above-market price, say $125, caused by the
shortage, while you buy at market price, say $124. Damages of $24 will
compensate you for your actual loss but will not entirely eliminate my
profit of $25. Or you may be fortunate enough to buy at a price below
market, say $124, while I resell at market price, say $125. Damages of
$24 will again compensate you for your actual loss but will not entirely
eliminate my profit of $25.
In the first case, where I resell above market price, my breach of con-
tract was not the cause in fact of the $1 profit that I made by selling above
the market price. Had I not broken our contract, I could have bought
another widget on the market for $124, just as you did, and sold it to my
new buyer for $125. In principle, at least, traditional market damage
rules accord with this reasoning and base your damages on your $24 loss,
not my $25 gain.
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In practice, however, courts have often applied traditional damage rules
in such a way as to favor disgorgement. They have done this, first, by
looking to market price rather than the buyer's actual cover price and,
second, by looking to the seller's actual resale price as evidence of market
price, thus stripping the party in breach of profit and depriving that party
of recompense for the skill and industry to arrange a sale above the
market.
If, for example, in applying the market damage rules to my breach of
our contract, the court bases your damages on market price rather than
your $124 cover price and uses my resale price of $125 as evidence of
market price, you will recover $25, not just your $24 loss, stripping me of
my $1 profit. 25 In a few startling cases, courts have forced an employee to
disgorge the additional compensation earned after quitting one job to take
a higher paying one by holding that the new salary is evidence of the
market price of the employee's services."' Courts do not, however, ad-
vance the notion of disgorgement as a justification in these cases.1 27
Alternatively, when you buy at a below-market price, conventional wis-
dom-apart from the Uniform Commercial Code-says that market price
nonetheless determines your damages. This measure of damages gives you
the advantage resulting from the skill and industry it took you to buy at a
price below the market. Thus if you buy a widget for only $124 when the
market price for which I sold it is $125, you are entitled to $25 damages.
But the disgorgement principle is not needed to justify this result. If you
bought for more than the market price-say for $126-it would also be
the market price of $125 that determined your damages. It is only fair
125. Courts have used the seller's resale price as evidence of the market price somewhat more
frequently in cases involving the sale of land than in cases involving the sale of goods. See Mercer v.
Lemmens, 230 Cal. App. 2d 167, 173, 40 Cal. Rptr. 803, 807 (1964) ("difference between [plaintiff's]
preemptive price and the market value of the property was properly awarded as damages"); accord
Murphy v. Lifschitz, 183 Misc. 575, 577, 49 N.Y.S.2d 439, 441 (1944) (sale of goods case), affd
mem., 294 N.Y. 892, 63 N.E.2d 26 (1945). But see Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547, 555
(2d Cir. 1954) (citing Murphy v. Lifsichitz for proposition that "the seller's resale price may be con-
sidered only in a situation where the buyer's loss of profits is too speculative and there is no other way
of measuring damages").
126. Roth v. Speck, 126 A.2d 153 (D.C. 1956) (where "hairdresser of exceptional talent" broke
employment contract, employer was allowed recovery based on value of employee's services as evi-
denced by $100 per week received from new employer less his old salary); Triangle Waist Co. v.
Todd, 223 N.Y. 27, 30-31, 119 N.E. 85, 86 (1918) (Cardozo, J., for the court) (although employer
did not prove "by experts the sum that [designer's] services ought to command in the market.. . . [i]t
did prove . . . the sum that they had in fact commanded" in subsequent employment). But cf. Wil-
liam B. Tanner Co. v. WIOO, Inc., 528 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1975) (published prices at which radio
station offered to sell advertising "spots" establish neither damages of plaintiff to whom station had
promised a number of spots at those prices nor that plaintiff could have sold spots at those prices).
Not even Palmer and Friedmann go so far as to urge disgorgement in this situation. See I G.
PALMER, supra note 14, at 444-45; Friedmann, supra note 46, at 519-21. But if the employee's
services are so unique or extraordinary as to merit injunctive relief, disgorgement could be justified.
127. For a rare exception, see Murphy v. Lifschitz, 183 Misc. 575, 577, 49 N.Y.S. 2d 439, 441
(1944), affd mem., 294 N.Y. 892, 63 N.E.2d 26 (1945).
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that if you take the risk of an unfavorable substitute purchase, you should
also have the advantage of a favorable one.
Under the Code, an injured buyer "may 'cover' by making in good faith
and without unreasonable delay any reasonable purchase of or contract to
purchase goods in substitution for those due from the seller."12 A buyer
who makes such a reasonable purchase can recover damages based on the
difference between the contract price and the cover price, even if the cover
price is higher than the market price. The Code does not make it clear
whether the converse is true, that is, whether the buyer is limited to dam-
ages based on the difference between the contract price and the cover price
if the cover price is lower than the market price. Because the Code re-
lieves the buyer of the risk of a substitute purchase above the market
price, it would be consistent with the expectation principle to deprive the
buyer of the advantage of a substitute purchase below the market price. 129
I would then get to keep $1 of the $25 profit if you covered for $24. The
question has generated a considerable body of academic writing, most of
which favors this result but ignores the disgorgement problem.1 0
Neither of these two possibilities, however, is likely to produce a sub-
stantial discrepancy between the impacts of the expectation and the dis-
gorgement principles. More interesting are those exceptional situations
where the two principles produce substantially different results. We turn
first to situations in which the market damage rules accord with the ex-
pectation principle and fall short of the disgorgement principle. We then
turn to a few situations in which it has been argued that the market dam-
age rules accord with the disgorgement principle and exceed expectation.
128. U.C.C. § 2-712(1) (1978).
129. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 comment e (1981) (if injured party
"makes an especially favorable substitute transaction, so that he sustains a smaller loss than might
have been expected, his damages are reduced by the loss avoided as a result of that transaction").
130. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE § 6-4 (2d ed. 1980); Childres, Buyer's Remedies: The Danger of Section 2-713, 72 Nw.
U.L. REV. 837, 843 (1978); Jackson, "Anticipatory Repudiation" and the Temporal Element of
Contract Law: An Economic Inquiry into Contract Damages in Cases of Prospective Nonperform-
ance, 31 STAN. L. REV. 69, 112-14 (1978); Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the
Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199,
259-61 (1963). It has been suggested that allowing the buyer a larger recovery based on a higher
market price rather than a lower cover price would give the buyer a "windfall." See G. WALLACH,
THE LAW OF SALES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 10.02 (1981).
A similar controversy concerns the right of a seller, who on breach by the buyer has resold the
goods at a price above the market price, to a greater recovery based on the difference between the
contract price and the market price. Again the weight of academic authority would deny such recov-
ery. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 comment e (1981); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERs,
supra, at § 7.7; Jackson, supra, at 112-14. But see Peters, supra, at 259-61.
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B. When Market Damage Rules Fall Short of Disgorgement
Although the market damage rules traditionally determine market price
at the time for delivery of the goods, there are situations in which the
seller resells either before or after the time for delivery. In one situation,
the seller holds the goods until after the time for delivery and resells them
on a market that has risen after that time. In another situation the seller
resells the goods before the time for delivery in a market that has already
risen and that falls by the time for delivery. In both, the disgorgement
principle would give a larger but less justifiable recovery than the market
damage rules.
To illustrate the first situation, suppose that instead of delivering the
widget to you at the time for delivery, when the market price has risen to
$110, I hold the widget until the market price has risen to $125 and sell it
to another buyer at that price. You are then entitled to only $10, not all of
my $25 profit. Had I not broken our contract, I could have bought an-
other widget on the market for $110, held it until the market rose to $125,
and sold it to another buyer for that amount. Therefore my profit of $25
was not the result of my breach."'1
Lack of causation, however, is not the conventional explanation.
Rather, courts have applied the mitigation principle to deny an injured
party damages that he could have avoided by taking appropriate steps to
make a substitute purchase. The question is when was the buyer expected
to purchase?
King's Bench in 1824 limited a buyer to damages based on the market
price at the time for delivery, not enhanced by any subsequent rise in the
market. The buyer's damages were based on "the difference between the
contract price and the [market] price which the article bore at or about the
time when, by the terms of the contract, it ought to have been deliv-
ered."1 " American courts came to the same conclusion, 33 and this aspect
of the mitigation principle was later given statutory form."
The purpose of the mitigation principle is to encourage you to take
131. If I did not break the contract but bought another widget at $110, I would have to add $10
of my own to the $100 price you paid. Breach of the contract avoids my loss of the use of that $10, in
effect saving my interest on that amount. But since, upon breach, I am liable to you for $10 damages,
I lose the use of that amount or am liable for interest on it.
132. Gainsford v. Carroll, 107 Eng. Rep. 516, 516 (K.B. 1824); accord Startup v. Cortazzi, 2
C.M. & R. 165, 150 Eng. Rep. 71 (1835) (rejecting buyer's argument that Gainsford v. Carroll was
distinguishable because buyer had advanced part of the price and thus was deprived of the use of the
money).
133. See Shepherd v. Hampton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 200, 204 (1818) (Marshall, C.J., for the
Court) (where seller broke contract for sale of cotton by falling to deliver, "the price of the article at
the time it was to be delivered, is the measure of damages"); Medema Homes, Inc. v. Lynn, 647 P.2d
664 (Colo. 1982) (buyer of home not entitled to damages where market price at date for conveyance
was same as contract price, though seller later sold home for higher price).
134. See infra note 175.
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steps to minimize the loss resulting from my breach. But it does not follow
from the mitigation principle that you should be denied a claim under the
disgorgement principle if the market happens to rise after that time and if
I happen to sell on the higher market. You would have a claim under the
disgorgement principle based on my refusal to deliver, but you would still
have an incentive to mitigate-that is, cover-whether or not the market
rose. A higher market price would leave you with both a widget and the
profit of my resale. Even if the market did not rise further, covering
would leave you with a widget and your market damages.
It is the reciprocity principle, not the mitigation principle, on which the
rejection of the disgorgement principle must rest in this situation. Under
the reciprocity principle, a party to a contract should not be made to bear
the risk of an adverse turn in the market without being allowed the recip-
rocal advantage of a favorable turn. A party to a contract is generally
accorded such reciprocity in regard to market shifts. And it is implicit in
the traditional rules of contract damages that a party who has broken the
contract should not, merely because of breach, be denied such
reciprocity. 13 5
We now turn to the second situation, in which the seller resells the
goods before the time for delivery in a market that has already risen and
that falls by the time of delivery. Suppose that the market price for wid-
gets rises to $125 before the time for delivery and I resell the widget for
$125 on the market, but the price falls to $110 by the time for delivery,
when you learn of my breach. I offer to pay you $10 damages based on
market price at the time for delivery. Can you require me to disgorge the
entire $25?
Under the market damage rules you cannot."3 In some cases, this re-
sult accords with a strict requirement of cause in fact. This is so, however,
only if I could have bought another widget on the market and delivered it
135. Admittedly the reciprocity principle is ignored when a fiduciary is required to disgorge the
profit resulting from a rise in the market price of misappropriated property. The circumstances out of
which fiduciary obligations arise and the law's solicitude for the beneficiaries of those obligations
counsel against limiting the beneficiary to damages based on a substitute transaction in the market-
place. A similar point can be made when disgorgement is based on property or specific relief.
136. Prior to the Code, the result was the same even if you learned of my breach at the time of
my resale. The Code changes this by allowing you to protect yourself from a further market rise by
covering as soon as you learn of the breach. See U.C.C. § 2-712(1) (1978). Since you are protected if
you cover, you are expected to cover, and the time that you learned of the breach is therefore the time
for determining market price. See U.C.C. § 2-713(1) (1978). After that time, I have the risk of any
further rise and the advantage of any decline in the market. Thus if you learned of my breach at the
time of my resale, you could require me to pay damages of $25 based on the market price at that time.
Unaccountably, the Code does not make a similar change for a seller's damages. See J. WHrrE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 130, at §§ 6-7, 7-7; Jackson, supra note 130, at 101-06; Peters, supra note
130, at 199, 258-59.
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in performance of the contract; that is, if you contracted merely to buy a
widget rather than a specific widget.
There is, in any event, a more conventional explanation for the result.
By limiting your recovery to $10 if the market falls to $110, the market
damage rules reflect the reciprocity principle. If the market had continued
to rise after my resale at $125 and had stood at $140 by the time for
delivery, you could have recovered $40 from me. And since I bear the risk
that the market will continue to rise after my resale, I should have the
advantage of a decline. The disgorgement principle, on the other hand,
denies me this advantage by allowing you to recover $25 if the market
falls while not denying you the full $40 if the market rises. This is a
harsh result since you would be able to obtain a substitute widget on the
market at $110.
C. When Market Damages Seem to Exceed Expectation: Tacit
Approval?
Although in the situations just discussed, the market damage rules fall
short of disgorgement, in other situations those rules appear to exceed ex-
pectations. Some commentators argue that in these latter situations courts
give tacit approval to the disgorgement principle. 1 7 These situations can,
however, be explained on other grounds and therefore do not support the
principle.
The most compelling situations suggesting tacit approval of disgorge-
ment in connection with the market damage rules are those in which a
seller fails to deliver goods following a rise in the market and the buyer
behaves so as to appear to suffer less loss than market damages give."" In
one situation the seller fails to deliver goods after a rise in the market, and
the buyer might either wait until the market has fallen again before re-
placing the goods or not replace the goods at all. In a second situation,
before the seller's failure to deliver, the buyer has made a contract with a
sub-buyer for a price less than the market price at the time for delivery.
For an example of the first situation, suppose that you do not replace
the widget when the market is $125. Instead, you wait a month, the mar-
ket drops to $110, and you then purchase a widget at that price. I offer to
137. Thus Dawson suggests that "the factor of potential gain through breach has worked indi-
rectly, in unacknowledged ways" and "has probably been a powerful factor in establishing the prom-
isee's expectancy as the normal and accepted measure of damages for breach of contract." Dawson,
supra note 8, at 187. See also Simon & Novak, Limiting the Buyer's Market Damages to Lost Profits:
A Challenge to the Enforceability of Market Contracts, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1395, 1402-03 (1979)
(U.C.C. § 2-713 grants to buyer difference between market price and contract price but does not
require that buyer use market).
138. A similar case can be made in connection with situations in which a buyer refuses to take
delivery following a drop in the market.
1375
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 94: 1339, 1985
pay $10 damages, but the market damage rules plainly require me to pay
you $25, disgorging my entire gain. It might therefore seem that the dis-
gorgement principle is at work.1"9
There is, however, a different explanation. Under the reciprocity prin-
ciple, if your damages-because of the mitigation principle-are not in-
creased by a rise in the market after the date of delivery, they should not
be decreased by a fall in the market during the same period.140
Now suppose that instead of merely delaying replacement of the widget,
you do not replace it at all. Can I keep the entire $25 on the ground that
you have suffered no loss? Since the market damage rules require me to
pay you $25 in damages, disgorging my entire gain, it might again seem
that the disgorgement principle is at work.
Again, however, the result has a different explanation. It is but a short
step from ignoring a buyer's later purchase when fixing damages under
the market damage rules to ignoring a buyer's failure to make any
purchase at all. If a later purchase by a buyer is of no significance in
fixing damages, how can a buyer's failure to make such a purchase be
significant? Thus a chain of reasoning that begins with the application of
the mitigation principle to later purchases in a rising market leads to the
conclusion that a buyer's right to damages under the market damage rules
should not depend on whether the buyer ever makes a purchase of substi-
tute goods.141 While the result may be disgorgement, the explanation does
139. See Simon & Novak, supra note 137, at 1395, 1420 ("Apart from the delay, such a buyer
seems quite clearly to have suffered no loss other than the one measured by his actual replacement
cost."); ef. Simon, A Critique of the Treatment of Market Damages in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 80, 88 (1981) (same situation as text but buyer breaches).
140. This approach was adopted in both England and the United States. See Sale of Goods Act,
56 & 57 Vict. 30, ch. 71, § 51(3) (1893) (buyer's damages measured by "the difference between the
contract price and the market or current price of the goods at the time or times when they ought to
have been delivered"); UNIF. SALEs Acr § 67(3) (1906) (buyer's damages measured by "the differ-
ence between the contract price and the market or current price of the goods at the time or times when
they ought to have been delivered"). Both statutes establish a comparable rule for seller's damages. See
Sale of Goods Act § 50(3) (1893); UNIF. SALES AcT § 64(3) (1906). In both statutes, damages were
fixed according to the market price at the date originally agreed to for delivery, and if the buyer
delayed in purchasing replacement goods, the advantage of any fall in the market price or the disad-
vantage of any rise was for the buyer's account. The incidental effect of the market damage rules in
this situation may be to require the seller to disgorge the gain resulting from breach, but the explana-
tion of the result lies not in the disgorgement principle but in the combined effect of the mitigation
and the reciprocity principles.
141. This reasoning was even more compelling before the Uniform Commercial Code, when an
actual substitute transaction, even one made promptly, was at most merely evidence of market price.
The Code's introduction in U.C.C. § 2-706 and § 2-712 of seller's resale and buyer's cover prices as
alternatives to market price in fixing damages seems to invite the argument that an injured party who
has arranged no substitute transaction should recover no damages. But this argument would deny
damages, for example, to an injured buyer who delayed too long before repurchasing or who repur-
chased something different and was therefore not entitled to relief under the cover section. See, e.g.,
McGinnis v. Westworth Chevrolet Co., 295 Or. 494, 502, 668 P.2d 365, 370 (1983) (since rental of
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not lie in the disgorgement principle. " 2
For an example of the second situation in which the buyer's behavior
appears to result in less loss than market damages, suppose that, before
my failure to deliver, you had already made a contract to resell the widget
to a sub-buyer for $110. By the time for delivery the market price rises to
$125, and I resell the widget for that amount. Are you entitled to only
$10, your lost profit on the resale, or to my entire profit of $25? Under
the prevailing view, the damage rules based on market price require me to
pay you my entire $25 profit.114  Here too, it might seem that these rules
are based on the disgorgement principle.
But again, there is a different rationale. Under the mitigation principle
your damages are $25. The justification is that you still must honor your
resale contract. If you do not do so, you will not only lose your $20 profit
on the resale, but will also be liable for damages for breach of the resale
contract, and your total damages will surely exceed the $25 damages re-
coverable under the market damage rules.14 4  Cases involving buyers'
car was not "cover" under contract to buy car, buyer's damages "must be computed through the
'market price' formula").
Even if it is shown that the buyer not only failed to cover but also no longer had any use for the
goods, the result should be the same because, since there is a market, the buyer could ordinarily have
sold the goods or assigned the right to them on the market. There are, however, extraordinary cases in
which, though there is a market for the subject of the contract, the subject might not be marketable by
the injured party. See, e.g., Ogden v. Marshall, 8 N.Y. 340 (1853) (shipper allowed damages for
carrier's failure to carry the shipper's corn following a rise in freight rates based on market for
freight, even though shipper had not proved that he had corn to ship or that he could have disposed of
his right at a profit).
142. In analyzing these problems it is easy to lose sight of the fact that the market damage rules
focus on the market in which the injured party would arrange a substitute transaction to replace the
one that has fallen through because of breach. Where the buyer is the injured party, this is the market
in which the buyer would have covered by obtaining substitute goods and not the market in which the
buyer might have resold the goods had they been delivered. See E. FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACs 864
(1982).
143. This was the view in many cases prior to the Code involving breach by the seller. Coombs &
Co. of Ogden v. Reed, 5 Utah 2d 419, 303 P.2d 1097 (1956); Brightwater Paper Co. v. Monadnock
Paper Mills, 161 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1947); Iron Trade Prods. v. Wilkoff Co., 272 Pa. 172, 116 A.
150 (1922); Tennessee Fertilizer Co. v. International Agricultural Corp., 146 Tenn. 451, 243 S.W.
81 (1922) (buyer resold only four-fifths of goods); Clinton Oil & Mfg. Co. v. Carpenter, 113 S.C. 10,
101 S.E. 47 (1919); Floyd v. Mann, 146 Mich. 356, 109 N.W. 679 (1906); see Farnsworth, Legal
Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1145, 1190 n.189 (1970); Simon & Novak,
supra note 137, at 1395, 1405.
The leading case under the Code, however, involved a breach by the buyer. See Nobs Chemical,
U.S.A., v. Koppers Co., 616 F.2d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 1980) ("It is possible that the Code drafters
intended. . . [U.C.C. § 2-708(a)] as a liquidated damage clause available to a plaintiff-seller regard-
less of his actual damages.. . . But, this construction is inconsistent with the code's basic philosophy
.... ); see also J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 130, § 7-12, at 283 ("it is conceivable that
[the drafters of the Code] regarded 2-708(1) as a liquidated damage clause available to the plaintiff
irrespective of his actual damage," but the authors are "unpersuaded by the need to have a liquidated
damage clause"). A few courts took this position prior to the Code where breach was by the seller.
But these courts at least recognized the potential liability of the buyer under the resale contract. See
Texas Co. v. Pensacola Maritime Corp., 279 F. 19, 30 (5th Cir. 1922); Kaye v. Eddystone Ammuni-
tion Corp., 250 F. 654, 655 (E.D. Pa. 1918).
144. Since the market in which you purchase has risen by $25, the market in which your sub-
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resale contracts are thus consistent with the expectation principle and of-
fer scant support for the disgorgement principle.
D. Some Conclusions as to the Disgorgement Principle
This survey of the disgorgement principle in connection with contracts
for goods or services available on a market suggests that the principle is
neither justified nor needed. The principle is not justified because there is
no compelling argument in its favor as long as the goods or services are
available on a market. In addition, it violates the principle of reciprocity,
which has its strongest appeal in just those cases. The principle is not
needed because the market damages rules fall short of disgorgement in
only a few situations.
1. Some Different Assumptions
These conclusions rest on the assumption that widgets are fungible and
are readily bought and sold on a market. If the case for the disgorgement
principle cannot be made on that assumption, its acceptability as a general
principle is at best doubtful. Nevertheless, consider briefly two different
assumptions.
First, make the assumption that each widget is unique. You would then
have a right to specific performance of our contract and, if I frustrated
buyer purchases has probably experienced a similar rise, so that your total damages would be $35.
Suppose, however, that you reach a settlement with your sub-buyer that limits your liability for
breach to, say, $10, which makes a total loss to you of only $20. The authority that exists appears to
support recovery of $25 rather than $20. See United States v. Burton Coal Co., 273 U.S. 337 (1927);
Ernesto Foglino & Co., v. Webster, 244 N.Y. 516, 155 N.E. 878, 879 (1926); Iron Trade Prods. Co.
v. Wilkoff Co., 272 Pa. 172, 178, 116 A. 150, 152 (1922). But see Nobs Chem. U.S.A. v. Koppers
Co., 616 F.2d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 1980) (breach by buyer: "plaintiffs never acquired the goods from
their . . . supplier"). But the explanation for this appears to be not the disgorgement principle but
the desire to avoid complicating the dispute between us by introducing issues arising out of the sepa-
rate transaction between you and your sub-buyer. See Iron Trade Prods. Co. v. Wilkoff Co., 272 Pa.
172, 178, 116 A. 150, 152 (1922) (to consider resale contracts "would inject collateral issues");
Rodoconachi v. Milburn Bros., 18 Q.B.D. 67, 77 (1886) ("the law does not take into account...
anything that is accidental as between the plaintiff and the defendant"); ef. Slater v. Hoyle & Smith,
Ltd., 11920] 2 K.B. 11 (following reasoning in Rodoconachi where buyer accepted unmerchantable
goods and delivered them to sub-buyer who had made complaints but not taken legal action). Cases
involving buyers' resale contracts are thus consistent with the expectation principle and offer scant
support for the disgorgement principle. Foss v. Heineman, 144 Wis. 146, 128 N.W. 881 (1910)
(where buyer contracted to resell to sub-buyer all the lumber it received from seller, buyer's recovery
was limited to lost profit on resale contract resulting from seller's failure to deliver minimum amount
promised).
The Foss court did lend some support to the disgorgement principle by suggesting that damages
might be based on market price rather than on lost profit if the seller's breach was motivated by a
desire to take advantage of the rising market. Disgorgement could also be achieved if the sub-buyer
were subrogated to a claim by the buyer for damages based on market price, to the extent that the
claim exceeded the buyer's lost profit. But see Interpetrol Bermuda Ltd. v. Kaiser Aluminum Int'l,
719 F.2d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 1984) ("we see no reason to award the windfall of recovery against the
supplier to the sub-buyer").
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that right by selling the widget to another buyer, the generous rule that is
already law requires me to disgorge my entire profit. General application
of the disgorgement principle would have no effect. Most actual situations,
however, will fall between the extremes of fungibility and uniqueness.
Second, make the intermediate assumption that widgets-like tires or
trucks-have significant differences, but that other widgets with generally
similar characteristics are available on a market. You would not then be
entitled to specific performance and could not, at least under present law,
require me to disgorge my gain. Should you be given a claim to disgorge-
ment? From both my point of view and yours, the situation is now differ-
ent than it was when we assumed that widgets are fungible.
From my point of view, it is now less likely that the rules on market
damages will operate to deprive me of any gain. Since widgets have signif-
icant differences, I may be able to find another buyer who will value my
particular widget at $125 on the date for delivery even though you can
find a widget that will meet your needs on the market for $110 on the
same date. If I sell to the other buyer, I take no market risk, and your
claim to disgorgement is therefore more compelling than it was when we
assumed that widgets were fungible. When widgets are fungible, I can
make a $25 profit only by taking a market risk. And if I assumed such a
market risk, the reciprocity principle argues against disgorgement. Now,
although I can argue that at least some of my gain is the result of my skill
and industry in finding the other buyer, that gain may also result in part
from pure luck in finding the other buyer. Nevertheless, to allow your
claim would deny me any compensation for my skill and industry.
From your point of view, the sum of money that you are entitled to as
damages under the market damage rules will no longer enable you to buy
a virtually indistinguishable widget. Is there a significant risk that you
will be undercompensated? It is likely that you still have a variety of op-
tions. Perhaps you will choose to buy another widget that is, though not
identical, an adequate substitute. Perhaps you will prefer to abandon the
enterprise that involved the widget. The availability of these options tends
to reduce the risk of undercompensation. Of course, if your damages do
not wipe out my gain, you may argue that any risk of undercompensation
leads to some unfairness in the result. To eliminate any such unfairness,
courts would have to draw a line between the situation in which widgets
are fungible and the situation in which widgets have significant differ-
ences but are not unique. The practical difficulties of such a solution
make it an unattractive one. Under present law, you are entitled to dis-
gorgement if you can show that the widget is unique, so that your only
option was to abandon the enterprise that involved the widget, but this
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does not require the court to make any distinction other than the tradi-
tional one used in deciding whether to grant specific performance.
If widgets are fungible, the disgorgement principle is undesirable. If
widgets are unique, the disgorgement principle is unnecessary. And the
practical difficulties of extending the disgorgement principle to situations
in which widgets are neither fungible nor unique outweigh any arguable
unfairness that results from the market damage rules.'4
2. Economic Aspects
Economic analysis posits that if there is a second buyer who values the
widget more highly than you or I do, it is efficient for that buyer to ac-
quire the widget.1 46 One way to achieve this result is for me to sell the
widget to the second buyer, paying you your damages and keeping the
remaining profit from the resale. The prospect of keeping the remaining
profit will encourage me to commit an efficient breach if such a buyer
appears, and may even induce me to go in search of such a buyer. Because
you are made whole for your loss, you are "indifferent" to the breach and
hence will not be deterred from entering into contracts in the future.
It might seem, therefore, that application of the disgorgement principle
would be economically inefficient. If I am required to disgorge all of the
profit on resale, leaving me with nothing, I will no longer have an induce-
ment to commit an efficient breach by selling the widget to the second
buyer. If, however, we assume a world without transaction costs, even if I
deliver the widget to you for the contract price, you will resell the widget
to the second buyer. By hypothesis, it will cost you nothing to locate the
145. Another argument calls into question the view that it is immoral to retain gain acquired as a
result of breach of contract. Requiring me to disgorge my full $25 profit violates a basic principle of
fairness that might be called the "evenhandedness principle." By and large, the market damage rules
give similar treatment to sellers and other suppliers on the one hand and buyers and other recipients
on the other. Suppose, then, that you broke your contract with me for the sale of a widget for $100 by
failing to perform when the market had dropped to $90, and then waited until the market had fallen
to $75 before buying another widget. If you offered me the $10 to which I am entitled under the
market damage rules, could I insist instead that you disgorge your full $25 profit? You might very
well have bought a widget at $75 even if we had never made a contract. Only rarely would it be
possible to establish that the $75 was part of the $100 that you were to pay me.
It is therefore not surprising that all of the instances in which courts have required disgorgement of
gains resulting from breach of contract have involved disgorgement by sellers and other suppliers. All
of the suggestions for wider application of the disgorgement principle have also involved disgorgement
by sellers and other suppliers. Such a limitation seems inevitable. A buyer is not a trustee. Because the
law requires that a trustee keep trust funds separate from the trustee's own funds, a court can deter-
mine if those funds have been misused and, if so, can require disgorgement. But the law cannot
require that, on making a contract, a buyer keep the price separate from the buyer's other funds in
such a way as to enable a court to determine if those funds have been misused and, if so, to require
disgorgement.
146. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 89-90 (2d ed. 1977) ("breach would be
value-maximizing and should be encouraged").
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second buyer and to negotiate a resale of the widget. Economic efficiency
will still be served since the second buyer would acquire the widget.147
Thus in a world without transaction costs, the disgorgement principle is
as consistent with economic efficiency as is the expectation principle. 148
But the question is which principle better serves economic efficiency in a
world with transaction costs. The preferable rule of law then will be the
one that enables us to reach a negotiated term with the least cost.
Under the expectation principle, I the seller get the entire advantage of
the occurrence of the event (here, the appearance of the second buyer);
you the buyer are paid damages intended to put you in the position in
which you would have been had the event not occurred. Under the dis-
gorgement principle, in contrast, you the buyer get the entire advantage of
the occurrence of the event; I the seller am required to disgorge my gain
and am left in the position in which I would have been had the event not
occurred.
49
The premise of the traditional market damage rules is that it is best to
begin negotiations with a rule based on the assumptions that sellers would
prefer to bear the full impact of the event and buyers would prefer to
avoid it. The buyer's expectation can be fully protected, with no signifi-
cant risk of undercompensation, by a cover purchase on the market and a
damage payment by the seller. Under the market damage rules, the buyer
can pass along to the seller any costs of the buyer's cover transaction. The
buyer who covers avoids the transaction costs of finding the second buyer
and negotiating a sale or negotiating with the seller a modification of the
contract. In these circumstances, especially if the buyer does not normally
sell goods of the kind involved in the transaction with the seller, it is rea-
sonable to assume that the buyer would have little interest in bargaining
for any substantial part of the impact of the event in question.1 50 On these
assumptions, a rule based on the expectation principle best serves the in-
terests of both buyer and seller by closely approximating the term that
147. Even if you could not learn the identity of the second buyer, it would be to our mutual
advantage to negotiate a release to permit me to sell the widget to the second buyer at a profit, which
you and I could divide. On the more limited assumption that negotiations involve transaction costs, it
will cost us nothing to reach agreement on this.
148. The point can be put in more general terms: "All measures of damages are economically
equivalent in the absence of transaction costs." Farber, supra note 43, at 1478.
149. If we were to bargain over the inclusion of a damage term based on one principle or the
other, the resulting term would be reflected in the price. Thus I would have to charge a lower price to
get the benefit of a term based on the expectation principle, and you would have to pay a higher price
to get the benefit of a term based on the disgorgement principle. Of course we might negotiate a term
that provided for an intermediate solution, depending on our respective preferences for either bearing
or avoiding the impact of the event.
150. Since it is also possible that a second seller will appear, willing to take a low enough price
for a widget to leave the buyer with a profit after the buyer pays the first seller expectation damages,
the parties might decide that each should bear the full impact of a more advantageous bargain turning
up.
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would result if they were to negotiate one. The disgorgement principle
serves the interest of neither.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR LIMITED EXTENSION OF
THE DISGORGEMENT PRINCIPLE
A. The Argument for Extension
An argument can nevertheless be made for extending the principle to a
limited class of cases. Suppose that I contract to build a house for you
according to your plans for $150,000. I then find that by substituting
cheaper materials I can do the job for $25,000 less than if I follow the
plans. I make the switch, but you do not discover this until the house is
built and you have paid me the $150,000. The price at which you can sell
your house on the market is diminished by $10,000, and it would now
cost $60,000 to replace the materials to conform to the plans, largely be-
cause of the cost of undoing and redoing the work.
It is unlikely that a court would award you damages in the amount of
$60,000, your cost of obtaining full performance ("cost to complete"),
since the cost to complete will consist in large part of the expense of undo-
ing my defective performance. A court will probably limit you to damages
based on that cost and award you damages based on the diminution in the
price at which you can sell your house on the market, that is, $10,000.' '
But can you require me to disgorge the $25,000 that I have saved by
switching material in breach of our contract? Of course, if the diminution
in market price is $30,000 rather than $10,000, you will choose not to
rely on the disgorgement principle, but to seek damages based on your
$30,000 loss under the expectation principle. If, however, the diminution
in market price is only $10,000 and you are unable to prove the actual
$30,000 diminution in value to you personally, you would prefer disgorge-
ment of the $25,000 rather than damages based on the expectation
principle.
Here, as in the case of the widget resold, I have realized a gain that is
151. If a builder fails to complete performance or renders a useless performance, the usual mea-
sure of damages is the cost to complete. See Henderson v. Oakes-Waterman Builders, 44 Cal. App. 2d
615, 112 P.2d 662 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941) (untenantable and useless building built); Miner v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co., 265 Mich. 148, 251 N.W. 335 (1933) (garage built instead of barn). But see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348 comment c (1981) (where cost to remedy defects will
be clearly disproportionate to probable loss in value to the injured party, damages will be based on
diminution in market price to avoid giving the injured party "a substantial windfall"). See also Gross-
man Holdings Ltd. v. Hourihan, 414 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 1983) (contractor built mirror image of
planned house; owners entitled in damages only to difference between value of home as constructed
and value of home as it should have been constructed); Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239,
129 N.E. 889 (1921) (although subcontractor, unknown to builder, used Cohoes and other pipe rather
than Reading pipe in building house, court found defect "trivial" and ruled builder entitled to full
payment).
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not offset by your expectation damages. But there is an important differ-
ence. There I left you with the performance that you were to render
($100), which you could use to obtain a substitute on the market;1 52 here I
claimed the right to retain your performance ($150,000) and left you with
my defective performance and no real prospect of recovering damages
based on the actual loss to you personally. 53 My breach has subjected you
to a significant risk of undercompensation.
1. Cost to Complete and Other Indirect Solutions
Courts sometimes have given the injured party damages in excess of the
diminution in market value. They have done this in two ways.
One way is to reject diminution in market value as a basis for damages
in favor of cost to complete. 15  In our example, this would give you
$60,000 rather than $10,000, not only wiping out my gain of $25,000 but
leaving me with a loss of $35,000. But as has been pointed out, this solu-
tion is not generally available in cases like the one under discussion.
The other way is to hold that there has been no substantial perform-
ance. Suppose, for example, that you have paid me only 80% of the price,
retaining $30,000 pending final inspection. If you discover before paying
me the $30,000 that I have switched the materials, I must show that my
performance was substantial in order to recover on the contract. Under
these circumstances, however, a court will find my performance not sub-
stantial, and I will have no right under the contract to any of the unpaid
$30,000.155 A court may also conclude that I am not entitled to restitution,
so that I will have no right to the $30,000 on that ground either. My gain
of $25,000 will be wiped out and I will suffer a loss of $5,000. This
solution is severely limited, however, because it can be used only if the
breach is discovered before all of the price has been paid.1 5 6 Some writers
152. The choice is limited to a purchase "in substitution" if the buyer seeks recovery based on
cover under U.C.C. § 2-712, but it is not so limited if the buyer is content with damages based on
market price under U.C.C. § 2-713.
153. Because of transaction costs, you are not likely to be placated by the suggestion that your
remedy is to sell the house that I have built, add your $10,000 damages to the proceeds, and make
new arrangements for another house according to your specifications.
154. E.g., Young v. Cumberland County Educ. Soc'y, 183 Ky. 625, 210 S.W. 494 (1919) (builder
used soft rather than hard brick on outside of school); Turner v. Jackson, 139 Or. 539, 11 P.2d 1048
(1932) (builder used inferior paint, fixtures, and other materials in construction of apartment house);
accord Harris, Ogus & Phillips, Contract Remedies and the Consumer Surplus, 95 LAW Q. REV.
581, 589-94 (1979); Muris, Cost of Completion or Diminution in Market Value: The Relevance of
Subjective Value, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 379-80 (1983); Yorio, supra note 43, at 1424.
155. That the injured party has suffered no loss is irrelevant. See Gillespie Tool Co. v. Wilson,
123 Pa. 19, 16 A. 36 (1888).
156. In arriving at such indirect solutions, courts have frequently emphasized the "wilful" charac-
ter of the breach. Thus it has been said that a party whose breach is "wilful" must pay damages
based on cost to complete, while damages might otherwise be limited to diminuition in market price.
See Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REv. 521, 571 (1981).
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have argued from this that the prevention of gain is a factor in these cases
and that such cases lend support to the disgorgement principle.15" 7
2. A Direct Solution: Abuse of Contract
If a case can be made for disgorgement in situations like the case of the
switched materials, the question becomes: Can the wrong in these situa-
tions be defined with sufficient precision to yield a workable rule? We
shall call that wrong "abuse of contract."15 If I realize a gain as a result
of my breach of contract, there has been an abuse of that contract if you,
the injured party, are left with a defective performance and no opportu-
nity to use your return performance to attempt to obtain a substitute. 59
Under this rule, my breach by switching materials amounts to an abuse
of contract. You cannot use the money that you have paid me to attempt
to obtain a substitute. Yet, in spite of the breach, I have the right to retain
your performance. Disgorgement in this situation will deprive me of gain
resulting from a breach that is likely to leave you inadequately compen-
Neither the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 361(1) (1932) nor RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 348(2) (1981) mentions willfulness as a factor to be considered in deciding whether to
award damages based on cost to complete. A breach motivated by a desire for gain seems plainly
willful under any definition of the term. Corbin opposed the use of the concept. A. CORBIN, CON-
TRACTS § 1123, at 7 (1964) (use of term "indicates a childlike faith in the existence of a plain and
obvious line between the good and the bad, between the unfortunate virtue and unforgivable sin").
157. See Dawson, supra note 8, at 188. Like others who have held this thesis, Dawson points to
the case where a court must choose between cost to complete and diminution in market price as a
prime example of "situations where actual or potential gain through breach may have influenced the
working of the damage remedy." See also Friedmann, supra note 46, at 504, 523-24 ("concept of
unjust enrichment . . . is implicit" in cases that have awarded cost to complete); Harris, Ogus &
Phillips, supra note 154, at 593-94 (if diminution in market price is substantially less than cost to
complete, "there may be a 'windfall' which must be 'awarded' to one party or the other"); Yorio,
supra note 43, at 1393-94 (damages limited to diminution in market price may allow party "who
deliberately reneged on his promise . . . to retain an unjust benefit from breach").
For cases in which damages appear to equal the builder's savings, see Healy v. Fallon, 69 Conn.
228, 37 A. 495 (1897) (owner allowed difference between cost of boards required by contract and that
of boards used in gables and floors); Farrington v. Freeman, 251 Iowa 18, 99 N.W.2d 388 (1959)
(owner allowed difference between cost of windows required by contract and that of windows in-
stalled). See Groves v. John Wunder Co., 205 Minn. 163, 165, 286 N.W. 235, 236 (1939), also
discussed in note 168 infra, in which the court characterized the defendant's failure to have leased
land in a graded condition as "wilful" and said that the trial court's decision to limit damages to the
diminution in market price of the land "handsomely rewards bad faith and deliberate breach of con-
tract." Id. at 165, 286 N.W. at 236. For a recent article in support of this approach, see Marschall,
supra note 43.
158. This notion of abuse of contract differs from opportunism, which has been defined as "self-
interest seeking with guile" and includes "bluffs, threats, and games of 'chicken' designed to exploit
another party's presumed bargaining disadvantage." Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle: To-
ward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 982 n.38 (1983) (quoting
definitions of opportunism). "Wilful" behavior has been characterized as non-opportunistic where the
breacher is prepared to pay damages "calculated by the loss to the non-breaching party." See Muris,
supra note 156, at 571.
159. Cf Jones, supra note 9, at 456 (restitutionary claim should lie only if "the defendant has
saved himself expense by falling to perform a collateral term of a contract which he has substantially
performed; conversely there should be no restitutionary claims if he fails to perform at all").
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sated. If you did not pay any of the price, however, there would be no
abuse of contract, since you would be free to use that money to obtain a
substitute from another contractor. 60 If you paid part of the price, you
should be treated as if you had paid all of the price, but your right to
disgorgement of my gain should be reduced by the amount unpaid.' 6'
My breach by failure to deliver the widget to you, however, does not
amount to abuse of contract. You are not left with my defective perfor-
mance, and you can use the money that you would have paid to attempt to
obtain a substitute widget. Even if my breach consisted of the delivery of a
defective widget-one in which I had made a saving by a substitution of
parts-it would not necessarily amount to an abuse of contract. You could
reject the widget, or revoke your acceptance if you have accepted the wid-
get, and then use the price that you would have paid to attempt to obtain
a substitute widget.
A particularly important category for application of the notion of abuse
of contract comprises cases in which, because of the passage of time, the
promised performance is no longer possible. In these cases, as contrasted
with the case of the switched materials, it would not help the injured
party if courts were to be more generous in awarding cost to complete;
there is no cost to complete since no amount of money can turn back the
clock. 162 Precedent for applying the disgorgement principle in these situa-
tions can be found in cases that required disgorgement by sellers who
delayed the delivery of goods. 6
In most cases of abuse of contract, there is a significant risk of un-
dercompensation. What if it is clear that expectation damages would fully
compensate you for all your loss? If immediately after completion of the
house you sold it, as you had always planned to do, and received a price
diminished by only $10,000 because of the substitution, disgorgement of
the $25,000 that I saved would go beyond compensating you for your'
$10,000 loss. Nevertheless, the difficulty of identifying such cases for sep-
arate treatment argues against treating them differently. The Supreme
160. This assumes that my performance is not regarded as substantial and that I therefore cannot
recover from you on the contract.
161. You would therefore have no right to disgorgement if the unpaid amount exceeded my gain.
My gain would be measured in terms of savings of the cost of substitution, that is, the difference
between the cost to me of using the cheaper materials and what it would have cost me to use the
materials required by the contract. Since the purpose of disgorgement is to deprive me of the gain
resulting from my breach, the difference would be measured at the time that my breach occurred-the
time when I switched the materials. It would not, therefore, include the cost of replacing the cheaper
materials with the proper ones.
162. There are other instances, not involving the passage of time, in which a defective perform-
ance is irremediable. See, e.g., Moss v. Christchurch Rural Dist. Council, [1925] 2 K.B. 750, 752
("Suppose irreparable damage has been done to some historic building. No one would suggest that the
mere cost of putting new bricks in place of the old . . . would fairly represent the actual loss.").
163. See supra text accompanying note 92.
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Court of New Zealand may have had this difficulty in mind in deciding
Samson & Samson Ltd. v. Proctor.164 A builder in constructing a home
provided insufficient steel reinforcing. A few months after taking posses-
sion, however, the owner sold the home for a price undiminished by the
defects. The court concluded that the proper measure of the owner's dam-
ages was the amount the builder saved by not carrying out his contract. 65
In the case of the switched materials, there is a strong moral argument
for disgorgement. Most would agree that the fair thing for me, the
builder, to do, once I become aware of the opportunity to use cheaper
substitute materials, is to let you, the owner; know of this opportunity and
seek your approval of the change, perhaps by a price concession. The un-
fairness in switching materials is that you have made no choice but have
instead been left with a house constructed of cheaper materials. Damages
based on diminution in market price will not pay for the replacement of
the materials. They will at most enable you, if you sell the house and add
the damages to the proceeds, to begin again to have a house built accord-
ing to your specifications. Otherwise you are left with a house constructed
with the switched materials. In either event, the risk of undercompensa-
tion is apparent. In the case of the widget resold, however, the market
damage rules give you a sum that will enable you to purchase on the
market a reasonable substitute of your choice. The point is not that my
behavior in switching materials entitles you to damages sufficient to pay
for the installation of the specified materials. It is rather that the unfair-
ness of my leaving you with the switched materials and the resulting risk
of undercompensation justifies disgorgement of any gain resulting from
the switch. 66
3. Economic Aspects
In the case of the widget resold, my right to retain any profit remaining
after compensating you for your disappointed expectation could be justi-
fied on the ground that it was best to begin negotiations with a rule based
on the assumption that I would prefer to bear and you would prefer to
avoid the full impact of the event in question-the appearance on the
164. [1975] 1 N.Z.L.R. 655 (N.Z.S.C.).
165. Id. at 656; see also Joyner v. Weeks, [1891] 2 Q.B. 31 (damages for lessee's failure to deliver
subsequently altered premises in good repair is cost, at time lease ended, of putting premises into state
of repair required by covenant).
166. The principle of evenhandedness discussed in note 145 poses no problem. In the case of the
widget resold, the disgorgement principle cannot be effectively extended to require buyers to disgorge
in situations analogous to those in which sellers would be required to disgorge. In the case of the
switched materials, the breach is one that is characteristic of builders and not of owners; there is no
analogous situation in which the issue of disgorgement can arise as to an owner.
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scene of a second buyer who was willing to pay enough for the widget to
leave a profit after you have received your expectation damages.
But this is not so in the case of the switched materials. Here the event
in question is my finding that by substituting cheaper materials, I can do
the job for $25,000 less, so that I will be left with a gain after I have paid
you damages based on diminution in value. It is more reasonable to as-
sume that you would prefer to bear the full impact of the switch, even
though this would be reflected in a higher price. Since you would then be
entitled to any saving made by my switching of materials, I would there-
fore be indifferent as to any such saving. Thus, if I found that I could
save $25,000 by substituting materials, it would not be in my interest
simply to make the switch, for you would then be entitled to the entire
saving. It would rather be in my interest to let you know of the possible
saving-and negotiate a modification of our contract under which we
would share in the saving. A rule based on the disgorgement principle will
therefore come closer to the terms that would result if we were to negoti-
ate them than will a rule based on the expectation principle.
B. Possible Limits on Extension
1. Gain in Terms of Saving of the Cost of Modification
In the examples of abuse of contract given so far, gain was measured in
terms of saving of the cost of substitution. In the case of the materials
switched, this was what I saved by not using the materials required by the
contract. There are, however, cases of abuse of contract in which there is
no gain in terms of saving of the cost of substitution though there is gain
in terms of saving of the cost of modification. Can the concept of abuse of
contract be extended to required disgorgement in these cases?
The leading examples involve restoration of property, usually land.
Suppose that I lease land from you in order to extract minerals, promising
to restore the land to its original condition by the end of the term. I fail to
restore it and the cost to do so would be $30,000. Restoring the land
would, however, increase its price on the market by only $10,000. I offer
to pay you $10,000 as damages, keeping the remaining $20,000 for my-
self. Can I be required to disgorge any of the $20,000? (A court would
not grant you equitable relief by ordering me to restore the land in these
circumstances, so that disgorgement would not be justified on the ground
that such a right was frustrated.)
Courts that have been asked to determine the landowner's damages
under the expectation principle in such cases have themselves left the
landscape in a remarkably uneven condition. They have held sometimes
that your lost expectation is no more than the $10,000 diminution in mar-
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ket price1 17 and sometimes held that your lost expectation is the full
$30,000 cost to complete.268
In order to see how the disgorgement principle might be applied in such
situations, it is useful to ask why there is a discrepancy between the cost
to complete and the diminution in market price. Why, when we made the
contract, was either of us willing to make an agreement requiring me to
do work that will now cost me more than the increase in the market price
of your land?
One possible explanation is that when we made the contract, you over-
estimated the effect that restoration would have on the value of the land.
You might have misjudged the market as of the time the contract was
made, or you might have been correct in your assessment then, only to
watch the market drop and thus reduce the effect of restoration. In either
event, since your recovery under the expectation principle is based on your
actual loss, my payment of $10,000 is all that you are entitled to under
the expectation principle. If this is the explanation, it is difficult to see
why I should be required to disgorge any of the remaining $20,000.
Another possible answer, however, is that the price was high because
the special value to you of restoration is greater than the $10,000 at which
the market values it. In principle, you should then recover damages based
upon your actual loss in special value under the expectation principle.1 '
In practice, however, you may be unable to prove with sufficient certainty
your loss of special value, so that if you are limited to expectation dam-
ages you will have to content yourself with the $10,000 based on market
price. Allowing you to recover more than $10,000 under the disgorgement
principle would then have a similar appeal to that in the case of the
materials switched-it would deprive me of gain resulting from a breach
that left you inadequately compensated.
A third possible explanation of the discrepancy is that I underestimated
the cost of restoration, thinking that I could do it for only $10,000 rather
than $30,000. I might have misjudged my costs at the time the contract
167. The leading American case is Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla.
1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 906 (1963), in which restoring a farm after strip mining would have
cost about $29,000 and would have increased the market price of the farm by only $300. Accord
Eastern S.S. Lines, Inc. v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 167 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (restoration of ship); City
of Anderson v. Salling Concrete Corp., 411 N.E.2d 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (land fill not brought to
level specified in lease). The leading English case, known as the Ocean Island case, is Tito v. Wad-
dell (No. 2), [1977] 1 Ch. 106.
168. The leading case is Groves v. John Wunder Co., 205 Minn. 163, 286 N.W. 235 (1939), in
which restoring land after removal of gravel would have cost upwards of $60,000 and would have
increased the market price of the land by only $12,160. Accord American Standard, Inc. v. Schect-
man, 80 A.D.2d 318, 439 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1981); c.f Rock Island Improvement Co. v. Helmerich &
Payne, Inc., 698 F.2d 1075 (10th Cir. 1983) (refusing to follow Peevyhouse because of enactment of
Oklahoma Open Cut Land Reclamation Act).
169. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 comment b & illustration 1 (1981).
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was made, wrongly thinking that I could do the restoration for $10,000.17o
Or I might have been correct in my assessment of cost at the time the
contract was made, only to have a subsequent rise in prices push the cost
of restoration up $30,000.71 In either event, since your recovery under the
expectation principle is based on your loss and not my cost, $10,000 is all
that you are entitled to under that principle. There are two reasons why it
seems right in such circumstances to require me to disgorge at least some
of the remaining $20,000.
First, had I overestimated rather than underestimated my costs, I could
have enforced against you what would then have been for me an advanta-
geous contract. Second, had I realized before beginning performance that I
had underestimated the cost of restoration and refused to begin perform-
ance, you would have been entitled under the expectation principle to
damages based on another contractor's price. Since that contractor would
not have underestimated the cost of restoration, the price would have been
roughly $30,000 higher than my price. I would then have been liable in
damages based on that difference and you would have been more than
compensated for any loss in special value.
Under the notion of abuse of contract I would have to disgorge my gain.
But what is my gain in these circumstances? Here the answer is not as
easy as it was in the case of the switched materials, where my saving
resulted from the use of cheaper materials. 172 Certainly my gain is not the
full $20,000. Had I, before any breach, recognized your right to perform-
ance and negotiated a settlement with you, relieving me of the duty of
performance and avoiding a breach on my part, that settlement would
have left you far short of $20,000. It is both practical and fair to resolve
this uncertainty in favor of the aggrieved party by requiring the party in
breach to disgorge the gain in terms of saving of the cost of modification.
I would be required to disgorge the sum that you could reasonably have
charged for a modification of the contract relieving me of the duty of re-
storing the land.
Such authority as exists, however, is opposed to measuring gain in
170. This may have been the explanation in the Peevyhouse case. See L. FuLLER & M. EISEN-
BERG, supra note 123, at 196-97 (suggesting, based on court papers, that error as to amount of coal
frustrated plan of restoration).
171. See Eastern S.S. Lines, 112 F. Supp. at 175.
172. It is also possible that all or part of the explanation of the discrepancy is similar to that in
the case of the switched materials. It might, for example, have been possible to restore the land for
only $10,000 had normal steps been taken as the work progressed. But by cutting corners and failing
to take such steps I saved, say, $15,000, with the result that it will now cost $30,000 to restore the
land. In that rather unlikely event, the notion of abuse of contract would require me to disgorge
$15,000, my gain as measured by saving in terms of the cost of substitution. To the extent that this is
only part of the explanation of the discrepancy, gain should be measured in this fashion.
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terms of saving of the cost of modification. In the Ocean Island Case,17 3
inhabitants of the Ocean Island in the South Pacific had granted the right
to mine phosphate to the British Phosphate Commissioners, who promised
to replant the land when they were done. When the Commissioners real-
ized that this could be done only at enormous cost, they refused to fulfill
their promise. The court, rejecting plaintiffs' suggestion that damages
should be based upon what the British Phosphate Commissioners would
have paid to be released from their obligation to replant, limited the land-
owners' recovery to damages based on the much smaller diminution in
market price. The court reasoned that cases where the plaintiff initially
had a right to specific performance did not apply because those cases
merely allowed recovery for the loss that the plaintiff suffered by the de-
fendant's failure to observe the obligation to obtain the plaintiff's consent.
And since the court would not allow damages based on cost to complete,
the landowners lost nothing by the Commissioner's failure to negotiate a
release.
This may be an adequate basis for distinguishing Wrotham Park.17"
The reasoning in the Ocean Island case, however, focuses on the expecta-
tion principle-the landowners' loss-to the exclusion of the disgorgement
principle-the Commissioners' gain. By failing either to perform or to
negotiate a release, the Commissioners realized a gain in terms of saving
of the cost of modification. If the disgorgement principle is to be coupled
with a restrictive requirement of cause in fact, it is essential to assume
that the hypothetical negotiations between the two parties are the only
alternatives to performance and that breach with payment of expectation
damages is not a possibility. Otherwise the disgorgement principle would
have no significance, for there would never be any gain in terms of saving
of the cost of modification.
Under the disgorgement principle, it would seem that the appropriate
measure is the saving of the cost of modification.1 75 Surely it is reasonable
to suppose that when you made the contract you would have been willing
to pay some price in order to be able to profit from the uncertain event in
question. That event was my realization that I could refuse to perform my
promise to regrade the land, pay you your damages (based on diminution
in market price), and still be better off than if I had performed my prom-
ise. If that event occurred, you would want me to negotiate a modification
173. Tito v. Waddell (No. 2), [19771 1 Oh. 106.
174. [1974] 1 W.L.R. 798 (discussed supra text accompanying notes 112-15).
175. Gain in terms of saving of the cost of substitution would still be the measure to the extent
that the injured party's claim was based on a departure from the promised performance, as in the case
of the switched materials. Gain in terms of saving of the cost of modi fication would be the measure of
the extent that the injured party's claim was based on a refusal to perform, as in the case of the land
unrestored.
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with you that would benefit us both and that would reflect any value to
you personally. If I were deprived of the gain that would result from my
failure to negotiate, I would have no incentive to act against your inter-
ests. You would have been willing to pay for a term that would have
required disgorgement to that extent."z 6 Note that there is both a lower
and an upper boundary to the amount that a court could award. The
amount could be no less than damages based on diminution in market
price and no greater than damages based on cost to compete.
It can be objected that measuring gain in terms of saving of the cost of
modification would be excessively burdensome. The expectation measure
requires that a court look to the value that performance would have had
to the injured party. The measure proposed here, however, would require
that the court look also to the cost that performance would have imposed
on the party in breach, an amount peculiarly within the knowledge of that
party. Furthermore, in estimating the outcome of the course of negotia-
tions between the parties, the court would have to assume that neither
party could turn to anyone else. These burdens parallel the uncertainties
that would arise if the parties were to attempt to settle the dispute without
court intervention.
The proposed measure, nonetheless, is superior to the two other choices.
One is to limit the disgorgement principle to situations in which gain can
be measured in terms of saving of the cost of substitution, as in the case of
the switched materials. The consequence of this would be a much more
modest extension of the disgorgement principle, which would fail to cover
an important instance of abuse of contract. Another is to require disgorge-
ment of gain based on cost to complete, abandoning the strict requirement
of cause in fact. The consequence of this approach would be a rule that
would amount to the allowance of expectation damages based on cost to
complete. Courts that disfavor this measure under the expectation princi-
ple would not favor it under the disgorgement principle.
2. Significance of Unintentional Breach
The concept of abuse of contract should not be limited to situations in
which the breach is in some respect intentional. Although opinions in con-
tract cases sometimes lay emphasis on the "willful" character of a breach,
contract law generally treats unwilling breaches in the same way as
knowing breaches committed to realize gain. Indeed, it would be hard to
implement a distinction based on the character of the breach. Given the
176. For a suggestion that a court might divide the gain between the parties, without specifying
very precisely the bases of the division, see Harris, Ogus & Phillips, supra note 154, at 593-94;
Birmingham, Damage Measures and Economic Rationality: The Geometry of Contract Law, 1969
DUKE L.J. 49, 70.
1391
The Yale Law Journal
eagerness of contracting parties to find possible legal justifications for non-
performance where this is to their advantage, having to decide whether,
and perhaps to what extent, a breach was committed knowingly would
place a heavy burden on courts. Any extension of the disgorgement princi-
ple should be without regard to the character of the breach.
CONCLUSION
For roughly three centuries, courts have worked to implement two prin-
ciples: the principle of the law of restitution that one should not gain by
one's own wrong and the principle of the law of contracts that damages
for breach should be based on the injured party's lost expectation. In
many situations, the two principles appear to be in complete harmony; the
traditional measure of damages based on the injured party's expectation
strips the party in breach of the resulting gain. But in other situations, the
traditional measure of damages does not accomplish this result, and the
party in breach is left with at least some of the resulting gain.
In selected situations-notably those involving fiduciaries, sellers of
goods who would be liable in conversion, and sellers of land-courts have
gone beyond the traditional measure of expectation damages and required
complete disgorgement. Courts have not, however, extended the disgorge-
ment principle to contracts in general.
This Article has found the arguments in favor of such a general exten-
sion of the disgorgement principle unconvincing. In the important situa-
tion of goods or services available on a market, the disgorgement principle
is undesirable because, among other reasons, it fails to take account of
both the principle of reciprocity and the principle of evenhandedness.
There are, nonetheless, contract breaches to which the disgorgement
principle ought to extend. These involve abuse of contract, the rendering
of a defective performance that leaves the injured party with no opportu-
nity to use that party's own return performance to obtain a reasonable
substitute. In these situations, limiting the injured party to damages based
on the expectation principle poses a significant risk of undercompensation.
It is therefore appropriate to require the party in breach, who has placed
the injured party in this position, to disgorge any gain resulting from the
breach. A persuasive analogy can be found in cases that extend the dis-
gorgement principle beyond promises to sell land to other promises that
are enforceable in equity. Since the basis of equitable relief is generally
the inadequacy of the damage remedy, these cases illustrate a general pro-
position that a party in breach should be required to disgorge any gain
resulting from the breach when the breach has left the injured party with
a significant risk of undercompensation. Extending the disgorgement prin-
ciple to cases involving abuse of contract serves this end.
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If the disgorgement principle is extended to such cases, it is appropriate
to measure gain not in terms of profit but in terms of saving of the cost of
other means. Sometimes this will be saving of the cost of substitution and
sometimes saving of the cost of modification. Again, a persuasive analogy
can be found in cases that extend the disgorgement principle generally to
promises that are enforceable in equity, since at least some of these cases
have used saving as the measure of gain. Where courts have measured
gain by profit rather than saving, they may be influenced by a suspicion
that the lesser measure of saving would fall far short of the expectation
damages that the injured party actually may have suffered as a result of
the breach. Where there is no reason for such a suspicion, saving is a
more suitable measure than is profit.
The proposal made here is more practical than the sweeping suggestion
that the disgorgement principle be extended generally to all contracts. It
would go far towards relieving the tension between the expectation and
disgorgement principles.
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